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INTRODUCTION 
Courts resolve antitrust cases by applying various modes of 
analysis.3 These modes range across a spectrum from so-called “full 
blown” rule of reason analysis at one end to per se condemnation at the 
other.4 Per se rules condemn limited categories of conduct by applying a 
conclusive presumption of net anticompetitive effects, while rule of 
reason analysis requires a court to engage in case-specific evaluation of 
evidence bearing on actual or predictable competitive effects.5 Although 
the per se rules have obvious advantages of clarity, administrability, and 
predictability, the sorts of conduct falling under these rules have been 
narrowed in recent years as courts have become more wary of 
condemning legitimate competitive conduct.6 For example, although 
vertical price restraints and certain vertical non-price restraints were per 
se illegal for roughly 100 years, recent cases have established that all 
vertical price and non-price restraints are to be evaluated based upon 
some degree of analysis of the defendant’s market power or ability to 
affect market competition, as well as a contextual review of the 
competitive effects of the challenged conduct. Thus, the rule of reason 
now applies to all antitrust matters other than hard-core cartel cases 
involving horizontal price fixing or market allocations.7 Although 
horizontal group boycotts and tying arrangements remain nominally 
subject to per se condemnation, even these offenses are evaluated more 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 769 (1999). 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 763. 
 6. The Supreme Court has over the past three decades relegated all vertical 
restraints to rule of reason analysis, thus removing vertical maximum and minimum 
price fixing, as well as vertical territorial restraints, from their prior analysis under per 
se rules. See Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling 
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U. S. 365 (1967), to extend rule of reason 
analysis to vertical territorial restraints); State Oil Co. v. Kahn, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) 
(overruling Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), to 
extend the rule of reason to maximum resale price fixing); Leegin Creative Leather 
Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (further overruling Dr. Miles to apply 
rule of reason analysis to minimum resale price fixing). The Court has also expressed 
reluctance in some cases to find that horizontal price fixing should be condemned, if at 
all, under per se analysis. See, e.g., Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 769. 
 7. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 886 (“Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal 
agreements among competitors to fix prices . . . or to divide markets . . . .”) (citations 
omitted). 
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cautiously under a hybrid approach in which the court engages in market 
power analysis or an evaluation of proffered business justifications.8 
At the same time, the broadening role for rule of reason analysis 
has been accompanied by Supreme Court decisions that have obscured 
the meaning and proper application of the rule, leaving lower courts 
with no clear standards.9 Indeed, the rule of reason is no rule at all, but 
rather a set of vague and inconsistent objectives that a court should set 
for itself in evaluating conduct under an antitrust challenge.10 That is, the 
“rule” merely directs the court to condemn conduct only where doing so 
will achieve certain purposes, such as protecting marketplace 
competition.11 The various objectives are supposed to be achieved by 
balancing harms against benefits to competition and weighing such 
ineffables as the corporate purpose behind the conduct, its history, the 
marketplace context, and the experience of courts with similar 
restraints.12 Furthermore, it is now explicit that the rule of reason 
provides no set boundaries around the depth or rigor of the legal and 
economic analysis required to decide an antitrust case. Instead, a court 
presented with an antitrust claim must decide for itself how much 
analysis is appropriate for the case before it: “What is required . . . is an 
enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and 
logic of a restraint.”13 Courts and agencies are frequently overruled for 
having selected a level of inquiry that the reviewing court later deemed 
to be too deep or too shallow. The reasons offered for these reversals in 
many cases offer little guidance for future cases. 
The rule of reason evolved away from its former dichotomy with 
per se rules as courts became persuaded that economics should entirely 
supplant other values, such as marketplace fairness, wealth distribution, 
political concerns, and individual freedom, and at the same time grew 
                                                                                                                 
 8. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 9. See, e.g., Cal. ex rel. Brown v. Safeway, Inc., 615 F.3d 1171, 1180 (9th Cir. 
2010) (holding that the conduct in question, revenue-sharing among rivals, could not 
categorically be addressed under either per se rules or abbreviated rule of reason 
analysis, thus adopting a newly-fashioned “quick-look-plus-per-se-minus” mode of 
analysis). 
 10. See, e.g., Maurice E. Stucke, Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule of 
Law?, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1375 (2009) (arguing that the rule of reason has so little 
content as to violate basic rule of law norms). 
 11. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779-80. 
 12. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). 
 13. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781. 
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concerned that the certainty and predictability of the per se rules are 
often outweighed by their potential to condemn legitimate competitive 
conduct.14 Inherently, the rule of reason invites a more nuanced analysis 
than the more rigid per se rules, but there is a cost associated with 
expanding the rule of reason’s scope. Certainty and predictability, and 
perhaps even deterrence, to some extent, give way to case-specific rule 
of reason evaluations; and the cost of those evaluations increases.15 
The result has been an abandonment of categorical antitrust 
analysis, which was once its mainstay.16 In an earlier time, the analysis 
of a Section 1 case began, and frequently ended, with the 
characterization of the alleged restraint.17 If the restraint was in the 
nature of an exclusive dealer territory assignment agreed to between a 
manufacturer and a favored dealer, it was so characterized as a vertical 
territorial allocation and condemned per se.18 The process of 
characterization was thus the focus of the litigation of claims under 
Section 1.19 These categories began to blur along with the courts’ 
emerging concern that antitrust law may condemn ,and therefore deter, 
efficient marketplace conduct. Thus, in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. 
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.(“BMI”),20 an agreement that was 
price fixing “in the literal sense” was not characterized as prohibited 
price fixing in recognition of the potential that the efficiencies of 
musical composition rights clearing houses might more than offset the 
limitations they represented to free and open competition among their 
members.21 As discussed below, a few observers believe Section 1 
analysis remains too rooted in categorization,22 but the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 14. THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: ECONOMICS, COMPETITION AND POLICY 4-5 
(John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 4th ed. 2004). Cf. HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 59 et. seq. (3d ed. 2005). 
 15. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 
ANTITRUST L. J. 135, 155 (1984). 
 16. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 779. 
 17. See Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 55-65 (2007) (tracing the demise of the per se rule). 
 18. See, e.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963). 
 19. See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in Antitrust 
Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207 (2008). 
 20. 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
 21. Id. at 8. 
 22. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19. 
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has clearly shifted from categorical analysis23 and has openly disparaged 
its propensity to yield “false positive errors,” condemning conduct that 
ought to be allowed.24 
Cut loose from categorical analysis, the rule of reason is truly a 
“vagrant standard.”25 The rule has always had an unbounded character, 
as has been observed many times in the past. As a leading antitrust law 
scholar observed in his antitrust law treatise: 
Without further elaboration, reasonableness is too vague a standard 
to guide the businessman’s actions or the judge’s discretion. Such 
openness is a mixed blessing. Unbounded by technical limitations, it 
reaches every evil. But unless disciplined by the purposes of antitrust 
laws, it is a vagrant standard. Uninstructed by knowledge of the 
economy generally or by experience with the particular market under 
scrutiny, the judge or jury may respond to the parties’ relative 
worthiness rather than concentrate on competitive effects.26 
However, the current problems with the rule of reason have little to 
do with judges or juries failing to discipline their evaluation of conduct 
with reference to the purposes of antitrust law. Instead, the rule is 
inherently confusing, unadministrable, unpredictable, and its many 
details have been poorly fleshed out by the Supreme Court.27 Many of 
the most basic questions about the rule of reason remain needlessly 
unanswered. As discussed later in this Article, after 100 years the courts 
have not even gone so far to establish whether market power is a 
necessary element of a rule of reason case and in fact have articulated 
inconsistent answers to that basic question.28 Another unsettled matter is 
just when a full-blown rule of reason analysis is “meet for the case.”29 
                                                                                                                 
 23. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81 (1999) (“[T]here is generally 
no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious 
inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What 
is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, 
and logic of a restraint.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (“[W]e have 
previously hedged against false inferences from identical behavior”); Verizon 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) 
(“The cost of false positives counsels against an undue expansion of § 2 liability”). 
 25. Areeda, supra note 2. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See infra Part IV. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780-81(1999). 
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There is no clear articulation of a standard by which parties and courts 
can predict how much analysis a case will entail. Also unclear is 
whether actual anticompetitive effects or theoretical ones govern in any 
particular case, since in at least the Cal. Dental decision Justice Souter 
seemed to place a heavy burden on plaintiffs once the Court constructed 
what amounted to purely speculative efficiency justifications. 30 These 
seemingly basic elements of rule of reason analysis remain unsettled 
after all this time. Thus, as the rule of reason has come to dominate 
antitrust law, it has at the same time, produced a discordant body of case 
law. 
It was understandable why the rule of reason in earlier years might 
have gone without much development as a result of the process of stare 
decisis. Plaintiffs had more reason to pursue per se cases through trial, 
and so the many obstacles in the way of rule of reason plaintiffs may 
have resulted in a paucity of judicial decisions to give more content to 
the rule of reason. However, the Supreme Court cases that gave the rule 
of reason its dominant role in Section 1 litigation date back at least as far 
as the landmark decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania in 
1977, when the Court overturned its then-recent decision that had 
declared vertical territorial restraints to be per se unlawful.31 For more 
than three decades now, the rule of reason has continued its steady 
ascent, and it now controls most antitrust litigation.32 
One commentator noted as long ago as 1994, the rule of reason 
“has no substantive content.”33 More recently, another scholar has 
argued that current standards under Section 1 do not even live up to the 
requirements of the rule of law, mainly by imposing sanctions on 
citizens who have no way of predicting if their conduct is unlawful.34 
That the rule of reason continues to lack substantive content is an ever-
enlarging problem as the rule of reason has displaced per se analysis 
considerably more since Mr. Piraino’s thoughtful article.35 
It is of course desirable, indeed unavoidable, that the rule of reason 
invites some degree of flexibility. Commerce, in a sense, is like a 
flowing river. As Heraclitus noted 2500 years ago, “[n]o man ever steps 
                                                                                                                 
 30. See generally id. 
 31. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 
U.S. 365 (1967)). 
 32. See supra note 6. 
 33. Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Making Sense of the Rule of Reason: A New Standard 
for Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1994). 
 34. Stucke, supra note 10. 
 35. See supra note 6. 
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in the same river twice, for it’s not the same river and he’s not the same 
man.”36 No two restraints are identical, and no two restraints are 
imposed within identical marketplace contexts.37 Still, flexibility is not 
the same as abject indeterminateness. Various critiques of the rule of 
reason that predate the Court’s shift away from categorical analysis 
raised concerns about the rule’s unbounded character.38 The boundaries 
that categories established have now eroded to the point that the rule of 
reason knows no meaningful boundaries. The administration of antitrust 
litigation, business planning, and the efficacy of the law are all 
adversely affected by this. If the particular categories that informed an 
earlier antitrust jurisprudence are wanting, the solution is not to abandon 
all content and leave judges and juries to make unguided decisions. 
Instead, the categories need to be refined. 
This Article presents a critique of the rule of reason and offers an 
approach for restoring some of its content. It begins by reviewing the 
historical development and expanding role of the rule of reason as 
applied to horizontal restraints39 through the Supreme Court’s most 
recent comprehensive explication of the rule in Cal. Dental.40 The 
Article then offers a critique of the modern approach to rule of reason 
analysis and explains its analytical incoherencies. The Article explores 
the courts’ diverse and inconsistent applications of the rule of reason to 
demonstrate how poorly the rule of reason standard works and to 
identify specific areas that remain in doubt. Since the Federal Trade 
Commission has attempted to reformulate the rule of reason within the 
constraints of Board of Trade and Cal. Dental, its so-called “inherently 
                                                                                                                 
 36. PLATO, CRATYLUS, in 1 THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 191 (B. Jowett trans. & ed. 
3d ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1892). 
 37. Barbara Ann White, Countervailing Power - Different Rules for Different 
Markets? Conduct and Context in Antitrust Law and Economics, 41 DUKE L.J. 1045, 
1069 (1992). 
 38. See Piraino, supra note 33. 
 39. This article does not address the rule of reason in the vertical context, which 
implicates a somewhat different set of considerations. However, the essential problems 
with the rule of reason, particularly its vaccuity, are equally of concern in any context in 
which the rule is applicable. To the extent that a clarified mode of analysis is required 
for horizontal restraints as argued here, the same can be said for vertical restraints even 
if the modes of analysis in the latter context may be more complex due to the greater 
claims to competitive legitimacy that may be made for vertical arrangements. 
 40. 526 U.S. 756 (1999). 
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suspect” approach is considered a possible repair.41 Finally, the Article 
concludes by proposing a complete reversal and repudiation of current 
rule of reason doctrine and substituting it with a categorical approach 
that will allow the business community, victims of antitrust violations, 
government enforcers, and the courts a measure of transparency and 
predictability. 
I. THE EVOLUTION AND EXPANSION OF THE RULE OF REASON 
The history of the rule of reason, and in fact of Section 1 doctrine 
as a whole, can be seen as a trial-and-error evolution. It began with the 
Court’s unqualified view of the prohibition against all restraints of trade 
in Trans-Missouri Freight,42which the Court tempered in Standard Oil.43 
Section 1 doctrine then developed into categorical modes of analysis 
with the introduction of per se illegal categories of conduct. For an 
extended period, the crux of antitrust analysis was a process of 
categorizing conduct, placing it either into or outside of certain 
categories that were deemed illegal per se.44 Since per se rules admitted 
of no justifications for the conduct, categorization eventually became 
more complex as the Court came to find value in evaluating the 
economic context for conduct that literally qualified as per se illegality 
but where rigid prohibition seemed potentially overbroad.45 Thus NCAA, 
                                                                                                                 
 41. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 36 (D.C. Cir. 2005), aff’g In re 
Polygram Holding, Inc., No. 9298, 136 F.T.C. 310 (2003); N. Tex. Specialty Physicians 
v. FTC, 528 F.3d 346 (5th Cir. 2008), aff’g In re N. Tex. Specialty Physicians, No. 
9312, 140 F.T.C. 715 (2005); In re Realcomp II Ltd., 2009-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P 
76784 (F.T.C. Oct. 30, 2009). 
 42. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897). 
 43. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911). 
 44. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST: 
AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 202-04 (West 2000). 
 45. An early example of the Court’s expression of concern about condemning 
legitimate conduct under per se rules is found in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 
441 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1979). There, the Court observed: “[t]o the Court of Appeals and CBS, 
the blanket license involves ‘price-fixing’ in the literal sense: the composers and 
publishing houses have joined together into an organization that sets its price for the 
blanket license it sells. [Footnote omitted] But this is not a question simply of 
determining whether two or more potential competitors have literally “fixed” a ‘price.’ 
As generally used in the antitrust field, ‘price-fixing’ is a shorthand way of describing 
certain categories of business behavior to which the per se rule has been held 
applicable. The Court of Appeals’ literal approach does not alone establish that this 
particular practice is one of those types or that it is “plainly anticompetitive” and very 
likely without ‘redeeming virtue.’ Literalness is overly simplistic and often overbroad. 
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Professional Engineers,46 and other cases established a hybrid “quick 
look” third mode of analysis.47 Nonetheless, the process of 
categorization in antitrust cases remained essential. This introduction of 
truncated rule of reason analysis, however, significantly blurred the 
categories of conduct, and the Court began to question whether the 
categorical approach really worked.48 Eventually in Cal. Dental, the 
Court abandoned categories altogether and introduced a truly case-
specific and more deeply contextual regime for Section 1 analysis.49 The 
rule of reason now calls for an “enquiry meet for the case.”50 
Coinciding with the trend toward blurring and then eliminating 
categorical antitrust analysis, the Court also shifted away from most 
vestiges of the per se rules, leaving only hard-core cartel activity subject 
to them.51 The Court’s increasing skepticism about the economic 
consequences of rigid per se rules led to the overturning of previously 
long-standing per se prohibitions against vertical market allocations and 
resale price maintenance.52 Aside from horizontal cartels, all conduct is 
now subject to some degree of rule of reason analysis. The end result is 
that the rule of reason has became considerably more important, but at 
the same time much less clear and predictable in its application. 
A. EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE OF REASON 
The rule of reason’s history has been traced too often to require 
significant attention to it in this Article. However, it is worth pausing to 
consider why the rule was adopted in the first place and how it evolved 
into such an unworkable standard that governs the analysis of nearly all 
alleged antitrust offenses.  
                                                                                                                 
When two partners set the price of their goods or services, they are literally ‘price-
fixing,’ but they are not per se in violation of the Sherman Act. See United States v. 
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 280 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U. S. 11 (1899). 
Thus, it is necessary to characterize the challenged conduct as falling within or without 
that category of behavior to which we apply the label ‘per se price-fixing.’ See id. That 
will often, but not always, be a simple matter. 
 46. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Nat’l Soc’y of Prof. Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 47. Id. 
 48. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 110. 
 49. 526 U.S. at 779. 
 50. Id. at 781. 
 51. See generally supra note 6. 
 52. Id. 
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Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:  
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or 
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be unlawful.53 
Initially, the Supreme Court interpreted the Sherman Act based on 
its literal meaning, and that all agreements in restraint of trade or 
commerce were declared by Section 1 to be unlawful – an approach that 
had more appeal as a matter of strict statutory construction than as a 
matter of public policy.54 As the Court observed many years later, 
“[e]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, 
restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very essence.”55 The Trans-
Missouri Freight56 decision thus portended to outlaw common 
commercial arrangements, even if on balance they were efficient and 
procompetitive.  
Thus, fourteen years after Trans-Missouri Freight, the Court 
adopted another approach for interpreting the statute, finding its 
language sufficiently unclear as to justify judicial interpretation, and 
calling on the common law to support the imposition of a rule of reason 
to clarify the statute’s purportedly vague and undefined terms, 
specifically the terms “restraint of trade or commerce.”57 The Standard 
                                                                                                                 
 53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 54. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290, 312 (1897) (“The 
language of the act includes every contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or 
with foreign nations. So far as the very terms of the statute go, they apply to any 
contract of the nature described. A contract, therefore, that is in restraint of trade or 
commerce is, by the strict language of the act, prohibited . . . . If such an agreement 
restrain trade or commerce, it is prohibited by the statute . . . .”). See also United States 
v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505, 569 (1898) (“Has not Congress, with regard to 
interstate commerce, and in the course of regulating it, in the case of railroad 
corporations, the power to say that no contract or combination shall be legal which shall 
restrain trade and commerce by shutting out the operation of the general law of 
competition? We think it has.”). 
 55. Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918). 
 56. 166 U.S. 290. 
 57. Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911) (“And as the 
contracts or acts embraced in the provision were not expressly defined . . . it inevitably 
follows that the provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which 
required that some standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining 
whether the prohibitions contained in the statute had or had not in any given case been 
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Oil decision gave no clear indication of what was meant by a “rule of 
reason,” but evaluated various aspects of the Standard Oil trust by 
reference to its “intent and purpose to exclude others” from competition, 
the character of the defendants’ conduct, and the resulting extension of 
power over the petroleum industry.58 
During the same term, the Supreme Court described Standard Oil 
to hold: 
[T]hat as the words ‘restraint of trade’ at common law and in the law 
of this country at the time of the adoption of the Anti-trust Act only 
embraced acts or contracts or agreements or combinations which 
operated to the prejudice of the public interests by unduly restricting 
competition, or unduly obstructing the due course of trade or which, 
either because of their inherent nature or effect or because of the 
evident purpose of the acts, etc., injuriously restrained trade, that the 
words as used in the statute were designed to have and did have a 
like significance.59 
Thus, in its earliest formulation, the rule of reason took its direction 
from the common law, and evaluated whether the intended or actual 
effect of a challenged restraint unduly contravened the public’s interest 
in “the free movement” of trade in the channels of interstate 
commerce.60 The common law had long recognized the validity of 
contracts that restrained trade, provided that they were “reasonable . . . 
in reference to the interests of the parties concerned and reasonable in 
reference to the interests of the public . . . .”61 
                                                                                                                 
violated. Thus, not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it 
follows that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the 
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced by 
the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining whether 
in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong against which 
the statute provided.”). 
 58. 221 U.S. at 75-76. 
 59. United States v. Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911). 
 60. Id. at 180. 
 61. Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535 
(H.L.) 565; see also Mitchell v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (K.B. 1711) (upholding a 
baker’s covenant not to compete with the bakery he sold to the plaintiff for a period of 
five years in a limited vicinity surrounding the business sold); Rogers v Parry, (1613), 2 
Bulstr 136 (upholding as reasonable a joiner’s promise not to practice his trade from his 
house for 21 years). 
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One important early gloss on the rule of reason was provided by 
Judge Taft in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,62 where he 
articulated what eventually became known as the ancillary restraints 
doctrine.63 After tracing the common law rules applicable to agreements 
not to practice one’s trade and not to compete with a business in a 
contract for its sale, Judge Taft observed that to be lawful, the contract 
that imposed some restraint on trade or competition: 
[M]ust be one in which there is a main purpose, to which the 
covenant in restraint is merely ancillary. The covenant is inserted 
only to protect one of the parties from injury which, in the execution 
of the contract or enjoyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the 
unrestrained competition of the other. The main purpose of the 
contract suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a 
sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such restraints 
may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the restraint exceeds 
the necessity presented by the main purpose of the contract, it is void 
for two reasons: First, because it oppresses the covenantor, without 
any corresponding benefit to the covenantee; and, second, because it 
tends to a monopoly. But where the sole object of both parties in 
making the contract… is merely to restrain competition, and enhance 
or maintain prices, it would seem that there is nothing to justify or 
excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have a tendency to 
monopoly, and therefore would be void… There is in such contracts 
no main lawful purpose, to subserve which partial restraint is 
permitted, and by which its reasonableness is measured, but the sole 
object is to restrain trade in order to avoid the competition which it 
has always been the policy of the common law to foster.64 
Under the ancillary restraints doctrine, the initial step involves 
asking whether there is some legitimate agreement to which the restraint 
is ancillary, and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonable in relationship 
to the legitimate objectives of the parties.65 A restraint is unreasonable 
under this approach either if it is “naked” and unconnected with any 
legitimate transaction, or if the restraint is connected to something 
legitimate but excessive for its purposes.66 This ancillary restraint 
doctrine falls neatly out of common law cases that approved of a seller’s 
covenants not to compete with the business being transferred, provided 
                                                                                                                 
 62. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). 
 63. Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 7-8 (2006). 
 64. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 282-83. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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that the restraint was reasonably limited in time and geographic scope to 
permit the buyer to fully exploit the business without interference from 
the seller.67 
The ancillary restraint doctrine does not entirely encompass the rule 
of reason, but provides a useful starting point for antitrust analysis of 
many arrangements that are removed from the reach of per se rules. 
However, even if a restraint that forms part of a legitimate transaction 
fails to meet the ancillary restraint test, such as by being unduly 
restrictive for the purpose intended, it may nevertheless be lawful, 
where, for example, the parties obviously lack sufficient market power 
to affect marketplace competition.68 
B. BOARD OF TRADE 
The most enduring explication of the rule of reason is found in 
Justice Brandeis’ landmark opinion in Board of Trade of the City of 
Chicago v. United States:69 
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as 
merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition. To 
determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts 
peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition 
before and after the restraint is imposed; the nature of the restraint 
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint, the evil 
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the 
purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is 
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable 
regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help 
the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.70 
This statement of the rule of reason has guided the courts for nearly 
100 years,71 as recently as this past term, providing the basis for the 
Supreme Court’s ruling that professional sport league restraints should 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Mitchell v. Reynolds, (1711) 1 P. Wms. 181 (Eng.); Dyer’s case (1414), 2 Hen. 
fol. 5, pl. 26 (Eng.). 
 68. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8. 
 69. 246 U.S. 231 (1918). 
 70. Id. at 238. 
 71. This language has been quoted by courts more than 240 times, based on a 
LEXIS search of the text. 
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be treated under the rule of reason on the ground that some cooperation 
is necessary to make the end product available.72 
Board of Trade marked an important departure from the ancillary 
restraint approach in the Addyston Pipe decision, which had tied the 
Sherman Act to the common law rule against restraints on trade.73 
Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade considered relevant a variety of 
questions going to the nature of the marketplace, the business involved 
in the restraint, its history and most importantly the actual or probable 
effects of the restraint, none of which had significance under common 
law.74 The common law ancillary restraint rule was limited to an 
examination of the parties’ intent and the relationship between their 
legitimate business transaction and the restraint. Board of Trade shifted 
the analysis toward a more modern economics approach that weighs the 
actual or probable effect of a restraint by examining the relevant 
economic market in order to assess the market power of the parties, and 
thus their ability to have an impact on consumer welfare. Analysis of the 
market “condition before and after the restraint is imposed” takes the 
Court far more deeply into economic analysis of effects than was ever 
contemplated by the ancillary restraint doctrine. 
One can compare the approach in Board of Trade with the common 
law by considering such cases as Mitchell v. Reynolds. Mitchell involved 
the sale of a bakery under a covenant by the seller not to compete with 
the buyer for a period of time in the same locale. The covenant not to 
compete in this historic case was lawful under the common law rule 
regardless of whether the parties had intended to assure the bakery’s 
buyer of a local monopoly for a period of years, which may very well 
have been the situation. Mitchell says nothing about the condition of the 
relevant market for the baking trade in the locale because the only issue 
was whether the restriction on the seller was minimally broad enough to 
assure the buyer of the fruits of the acquisition transaction. The rule of 
reason in Board of Trade might have yielded a different outcome if the 
parties not only sought to protect the buyer’s legitimate interests but also 
to assure it of a continuing monopoly; if the history of the baking trade 
in the relevant market made clear that the seller was the buyer’s only 
likely rival; if the buyer had previously started to enter the bakery 
market to compete with the seller and was induced instead to purchase 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216 (2010). 
 73. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. 231; Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271. 
 74. Bd. of Trade, 246 U.S. at 238. 
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the seller’s business at a price that shared the monopoly profits that 
flowed from eliminating rivalry, and so on. 
C. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PER SE CATEGORIES 
The cases that announced the rule of reason contained in them the 
seeds of the per se rules. Standard Oil attempted to reconcile the newly 
announced rule of reason with its earlier more rigid denunciation of the 
railroad cartels in Trans-Missouri Freight, where it found the restraints 
to be ones for which “resort to reason was not permissible,” 
[C]onsidering the contracts and agreements, their necessary effect, 
and the character of the parties by whom they were made, they were 
clearly restraints of trade within the purview of the statute, they 
could not be taken out of that category by indulging in general 
reasoning as to the expediency or nonexpediency of having made the 
contracts . . . .75 
A dichotomy between rule of reason analysis and per se rules 
emerged more clearly in United States v. Trenton Potteries,76 where the 
Court held that price-fixing agreements could not be defended on the 
ground that the price, as fixed, was asserted to have been a reasonable 
one. In so holding, the Court signaled an irrebuttable presumption of 
unreasonableness in price-fixing cases: 
The aim and result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is 
the elimination of one form of competition. The power to fix prices, 
whether reasonably exercised or not, involves power to control the 
market and fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices. The reasonable 
price fixed today may through economic and business changes 
become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.77 
By 1947, the Court was able to articulate unambiguously that price 
fixing was per se unlawful: “Whatever justification particular price-
fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not permit an 
inquiry into their reasonableness.”78 This led to a categorical approach to 
Section 1 analysis: 
                                                                                                                 
 75. 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911). 
 76. 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927). 
 77. Id. 
 78. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1947). 
2012] SAILING A SEA OF DOUBT 607 
There are, thus, two complementary categories of antitrust analysis. 
In the first category are agreements whose nature and necessary 
effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the 
industry is needed to establish their illegality—they are “illegal per 
se.” In the second category are agreements whose competitive effect 
can only be evaluated by analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed.79 
An essential step in any Section 1 case thus involved categorizing 
the conduct under challenge. Is this challenged conduct price fixing, or 
is it something that looks like price fixing but is instead more complex 
and perhaps worthy of deeper analysis? Did the defendants’ concerted 
refusal to deal with a supplier constitute group boycott conduct, or was 
it properly categorized differently so as to require evaluation under a 
rule less rigid? These sorts of categorization questions came to 
predominate. 
D. THE “QUICK LOOK” RULE OF REASON AND THE COURT’S 
EMERGING DISSATISFACTION WITH CATEGORICAL ANALYSIS 
The dichotomy between the rule of reason and the per se categories 
of analysis was always blurred by the problems of characterizing 
challenged conduct as fitting, or not fitting, into one of the per se 
forbidden categories.80 As such, the Court found itself faced with cases 
that challenged the categories of antitrust modes of analysis.81 Thus, the 
establishment of common pricing for all copyrighted musical 
compositions made available for licensing through the American Society 
of Composers, Authors and Publishers and Broadcast Music Inc. was 
rather obviously “price fixing” among the owners of the copyrights, but 
was evaluated under the rule of reason after the Court refused to 
characterize it as such.82 The problem, the Court noted, was that the 
conduct involved price fixing in only a literal sense; the context was a 
collaboration that provided a different product than any of the 
                                                                                                                 
 79. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). 
 80. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 19, at 1225 (“One of the problems with 
categorical analysis is that the boundaries of categories shift without logic or 
warning.”). 
 81. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc. 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Nat’l Soc’y of 
Prof’l Eng’rs, 435 U.S. 679. 
 82. Broad. Music, Inc., 441 U.S. at 8 (“[E]asy labels do not always supply ready 
answers.”). 
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collaborating participants could have marketed independently.83 Since 
this new product needed a price, someone had to set it and doing so 
should not be condemned as anticompetitive without an analysis of the 
economic context in which the conduct took place – even though the 
conduct was literally price fixing.84 The Second Circuit had condemned 
the arrangement, which indicated that the categorical approach was 
leading to undesirable results.85 The Supreme Court’s decision further 
demonstrates that the Court was stretching to exclude the blanket 
licenses from the “price fixing” category.86 
Eventually, the very notion of the categorical dichotomy began to 
unravel in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States,87 
where the Court applied rule of reason analysis to strike down a 
professional association rule that discouraged competitive bidding on 
the basis of price. Although the conduct was essentially a form of price 
fixing, the court did not apply the per se rule, nor did it explain its 
reasons for not doing so.88 The BMI problem was not present in 
Professional Engineers where the price restraint applied to the separate 
services provided by each independent professional, rather than to the 
pricing of the distinct output of a joint venture among rival sellers.89 
Nevertheless, the Court declined to apply either the per se rule or a full-
blown rule of reason analysis.90 Instead, the Court stated that although 
“no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate the 
anticompetitive character of such an agreement,” it was necessary to 
evaluate the Association’s proffered justifications for its rule before 
concluding that the restraint on price competition was a direct affront to 
the Sherman Act.91 The analysis appeared to proceed without reference 
to the usual categories of antitrust analysis. 
In 1979, the Court seemed to rely on categorical analysis, but began 
to recognize explicitly a third category of “truncated” rule of reason 
analysis when it struck down the NCAA’s rules restricting the number 
of football game television broadcast rights that any member team could 
                                                                                                                 
 83. Id. at 14. 
 84. Id. at 8-10. 
 85. Id. at 6. 
 86. Id. at 8-9. 
 87. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). 
 88. Id. at 687. 
 89. Id. at 681. 
 90. Id. at 692. 
 91. Id. at 692, 695. 
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sell and limiting price competition in bidding for television contract 
arrangements.92 The Court struck down the rule as an unlawful restraint 
on price and output, but declined to apply a straightforward per se 
analysis noting that the industry of college football is one “in which 
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be 
made available at all.”93 Nor did Justice Stevens delve into anything 
resembling a fulsome rule of reason analysis, which would have 
involved weighing the Board of Trade elements: evidence concerning 
any peculiar facts about the industry; market conditions before and after 
the restraint; the nature of the restraint and its probable and actual 
effects; and the purpose behind the restraint and the problem it was 
purportedly imposed in order to solve.94 Instead, the Court entertained 
only the last of these factors by considering rather briefly the various 
justifications offered by the NCAA.95 In adopting this approach and 
deviating from Board of Trade, the Court observed in a famous 
footnote: 
Indeed, there is often no bright line separating per se from rule of 
reason analysis. Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into 
market conditions before the evidence justifies a presumption of 
anticompetitive conduct.96 
After NCAA, even categorizing conduct as a “naked restraint” did 
not resolve the extent of inquiry required. 
E. CAL. DENTAL AND THE DISINTEGRATION OF THE CATEGORICAL 
MODES OF RULE OF REASON ANALYSIS 
In Cal. Dental, the Supreme Court finally repudiated altogether the 
notion that the rule of reason embodies a single unified substantive 
standard and shifted it to an undefined process by which courts are to 
proceed in evaluating alleged antitrust violations.97 At the same time, the 
Court repudiated categorical modes of analysis that had governed 
Section 1 since Trenton Potteries.98 Cal. Dental made clear that the 
categorical approach was fully repudiated: 
                                                                                                                 
 92. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984). 
 93. Id. at 101. 
 94. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 95. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113-15. 
 96. Id. at 103, n.26. 
 97. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779-81 (1999). 
 98. 273 U.S. 392 (1927). 
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The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect 
are less fixed than terms like “per se,” “quick look,” and “rule of 
reason” tend to make them appear. We have recognized, for 
example, that “there is often no bright line separating per se from 
rule of reason analysis,” since “considerable inquiry into market 
conditions” may be required before the application of any so-called 
“per se” condemnation is justified. “Whether the ultimate finding is 
the product of a presumption or actual market analysis, the essential 
inquiry remains the same—whether or not the challenged restraint 
enhances competition.” Indeed, the scholar who enriched antitrust 
law with the metaphor of “the twinkling of an eye” for the most 
condensed rule of reason analysis, himself cautioned against the risk 
of misleading even in speaking of a “spectrum” of adequate 
reasonableness analysis for passing upon antitrust claims: “There is 
always something of a sliding scale in appraising reasonableness, but 
the sliding scale formula deceptively suggests greater precision than 
we can hope for . . . . Nevertheless, the quality of proof required 
should vary with the circumstances.” P. Areeda, Antitrust Law 
¶1507, p. 402 (1986).99 
F. EXPANSION OF THE RULE OF REASON 
During this same period in which the categorical approach gave 
way to a less definite one, the Court retreated from per se analysis 
except as to the residual price fixing and market allocation offenses.100 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions express a decided ambivalence 
about the relative benefits of per se rules as opposed to rule of reason 
analysis.101 On the one hand, the Court has noted certain obvious 
benefits of per se rules: 
This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of 
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to 
the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for 
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 781 (case citations omitted). 
 100. FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 435-36 (1990). 
 101. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007) (referring to 
“false positives” and “false inferences” as concerns supporting a relaxation of standards 
for motions to dismiss antitrust claims); Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of 
Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 414 (2004) (limiting Section 2 liability to avoid 
potential “‘false positive’ mistaken inferences that chill the very conduct the antitrust 
laws are designed to protect”); Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 34 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (noting that application of per se rules “raises the total cost of error” while 
reducing costs of decision-making). 
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into the entire history of the industry involved, as well as related 
industries, in an effort to determine at large whether a particular 
restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly fruitless 
when undertaken. 102 
The Court also has made clear that administrative efficiency is not 
the sole foundation for per se rules, observing that they are also 
substantive rules having statutory force: 
The per se rules in antitrust law serve purposes analogous to per se 
restrictions upon, for example, stunt flying in congested areas or 
speeding. Laws prohibiting stunt flying or setting speed limits are 
justified by the State’s interest in protecting human life and property. 
Perhaps most violations of such rules actually cause no harm. No 
doubt many experienced drivers and pilots can operate much more 
safely, even at prohibited speeds, than the average citizen… 
In part, the justification for these per se rules is rooted in 
administrative convenience. They are also supported, however, by 
the observation that every speeder and every stunt pilot poses some 
threat to the community. An unpredictable event may overwhelm the 
skills of the best driver or pilot, even if the proposed course of action 
was entirely prudent when initiated. A bad driver going slowly may 
be more dangerous that a good driver going quickly, but a good 
driver who obeys the law is safer still. So it is with boycotts and 
price fixing… Every such horizontal arrangement among 
competitors poses some threat to the free market.103 
Some earlier cases offered additional benefits of per se rules. 
Topco, in particular, lauded the rules as necessary both for the business 
community and to avoid immersing courts into matters beyond their 
competency: 
Without the per se rules, businessmen would be left with little to aid 
them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find to be 
legal and illegal under the Sherman Act. Should Congress ultimately 
determine that predictability is unimportant in this area of the law, it 
can, of course, make per se rules inapplicable in some or all cases, 
and leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory 
in order to maintain a flexible approach.104 
                                                                                                                 
 102. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 103. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 433-34 (1990). 
 104. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (U.S. 1972). 
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Notwithstanding the administrative and other benefits of per se 
rules, the Court has overturned all per se rules that previously applied to 
vertical price and non-price restraints, weakened the per se rule 
applicable to tying by requiring proof of market power,105 and has 
created no new per se rule in at least a half century.106 In Leegin 
Creative Leather Products v. PSKS, Inc., the Court acknowledged its 
“reluctance to adopt per se rules.”107 In balancing the trade-off between 
efficient and predictable per se rules and the reduced error potential of 
more thorough rule of reason analysis, the federal courts have 
discernibly shifted to favor the latter.108 Reluctance to apply a rule that 
might generate “false positive” antitrust condemnation has repeatedly 
surfaced in recent opinions under both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman 
Act.109 On balance, the battle between the per se rules and the rule of 
reason has resulted in a “triumph” of the latter.110 Thus, aside from cases 
involving hard-core cartel activity, all Section 1 cases are relegated to 
Cal. Dental’s “continuum” rule of reason. 
The Court’s doubts about the wisdom of per se rules are not new. In 
Topco, Justice Blackmun concurred in the decision to condemn the 
association’s market allocation rule, but only because he felt constrained 
by stare decisis.111 Blackmun stated that the consequences of striking 
down Topco’s rule would be harmful to the public interest, but 
conceded: “The per se rule, however, now appears to be so firmly 
established by the Court that, at this late date, I could not oppose it. 
Relief, if any is to be forthcoming, apparently must be by way of 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1984) (“[A]ny 
inquiry into the validity of a tying arrangement must focus on the market or markets in 
which the two products are sold . . . .”). 
 106. The per se rule against price fixing seems to have been established at least by 
1927. See United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927). In United States 
v. Topco Associates, Justice Marshall cites Judge Taft’s 1899 decision in Addyston 
Pipe, among other cases, for the proposition that horizontal territorial allocations are 
per se offenses. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972). However, the concept of per se illegality in 
antitrust law did not crystallize until significantly later. Indeed, contrary to Justice 
Marshall’s view, Justice Burger actually dissented in Topco on the ground that the 
Court was creating a new per se rule. 
 107. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 887 (2007). 
 108. See supra note 101. 
 109. See supra note 101. 
 110. Piraino, supra note 33, at 1757. 
 111. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 612-13. 
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legislation.”112 The majority opinion in Topco also noted that there was 
considerable debate about the wisdom of per se rules, although most of 
the references were addressed to the application of per se prohibitions to 
vertical restraints – which the Court later abandoned.113 
II. AN ANALYTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE RULE OF REASON 
A. BOARD OF TRADE AND ITS CRITICS 
The Board of Trade opinion and its rule of reason have been the 
target of a steady stream of scholarly criticism from all political 
perspectives. Indeed, it is hard to find a kind word about Justice 
Brandeis’ rule of reason. Robert Bork, whose Antitrust Paradox helped 
usher in the current restrained view of antitrust, argued that Brandeis 
had fashioned a “deviant” rule of reason.114 His primary objection was 
that the open-endedness of Brandeis’ rule allowed courts to condemn 
conduct on the basis of any number of factors that, in his view, had no 
connection with the narrow economic efficiency objective of antitrust.115 
Bork argued that Brandeis was animated by a view of antitrust that not 
only protected consumers from private restraints, but also protected 
smaller and less efficient rivals.116 Thus, Bork analyzed the famous 
passage from Board of Trade as distinguishing “regulation” of trade 
from its “suppression” as reflecting an antitrust philosophy that 
permitted private restraints that protected the small and weak from the 
dominant.117 “A strong underlying policy orientation for Brandeis’ rule 
seems to have been sympathy for small, perhaps inefficient, traders who 
might go under in fully competitive markets.118 His rule thus spoke for 
the tempering of competition by private agreement.”119 Thus one 
longstanding objection to Board of Trade has been that it reinforces the 
power of individual judges to impose their own philosophies on 
competitive markets.120 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 609, n.10. 
 114. Robert H. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and 
Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 817 (1965). 
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Judge Taft’s objection to at least one version of a rule of reason is 
perhaps echoed in Bork’s later critique of Board of Trade. In Addyston 
Pipe, Judge Taft rejected arguments that sought to invoke English case 
law for the proposition that some naked restraints on competition were 
permissible.121 In fashioning his ancillary restraints doctrine, Judge Taft 
rejected these arguments on the ground that judges should not be 
deciding how much competition is a good thing.122 
It is true that there are some cases in which the courts, mistaking, as 
we conceive, the proper limits of the relaxation of the rules for 
determining the unreasonableness of restraints of trade, have set sail 
on a sea of doubt, and have assumed the power to say, in respect to 
contracts which have no other purpose and no other consideration on 
either side than the mutual restraint of the parties, how much 
restraint of competition is in the public interest, and how much is 
not. The manifest danger in the administration of justice according to 
so shifting, vague, and indeterminate a standard would seem to be a 
strong reason against adopting it.123 
Others have expressed concerns about administrability of a rule that 
sets almost no meaningful boundaries around what antitrust courts can 
consider.124 Professor Herbert Hovenkamp observed in his indictment of 
the rule: “Brandeis’ statement of the rule of reason . . . has been one of 
the most damaging in the annals of antitrust” as it “has suggested to 
many courts that . . . nearly everything is relevant.”125 Richard Posner 
has similarly argued that Board of Trade fails to provide meaningful 
guidance, and thus can be interpreted to prohibit conduct that is efficient 
on balance.126 Referring to Brandeis’ formulation of the rule of reason, 
Posner observes: “This is not a helpful formulation. To be told to look to 
the history, circumstances, purposes and effects of a challenged 
restriction is not to be provided with usable criteria of illegality.”127 
Most recently, Professor Maurice Stucke presented a thoughtful 
analysis of the rule of reason and concluded that it does not even 
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comport with internationally-recognized rule of law standards.128 A 
primary concern in this regard is vagueness.129 Even prior to Board of 
Trade, the rule of reason announced in Standard Oil had precipitated a 
policy battle between those who argued for clearer rules and those, 
including Justice White, who believed the legal standard should allow 
courts discretion to permit certain private arrangements.130 Board of 
Trade, Stucke argues, set back President Wilson’s legislative efforts to 
bring clarity to antitrust law through the enactments of the Clayton Act 
and the Federal Trade Commission Act.131 “Even if another court found 
a similar practice in a different industry anticompetitive, [Board of 
Trade’s] rule-of-reason factors would treat each challenged restraint as 
novel. Liability would turn on facts peculiar to the industry to which, 
and during the period when, the defendant applied the restraint.”132 
Years later, after the rule of reason came to predominate in antitrust law, 
little has been achieved to give it clarity.133 Stucke posed the question: 
“So how does the rule of reason, the Court’s ‘prevailing,’ ‘usual’ and 
‘accepted standard’ for evaluating conduct under the Sherman Act, fare 
under these ruleof-law principles? Poorly.”134 Specifically, he points out 
that those who are subject to the law cannot effectively plan their affairs 
to conform to the demands of the coercive power of government; and 
that the rule is so obscure as to allow the power of government to be 
exercised arbitrarily.135 That there is a plausible argument that a rule of 
this vintage is so devoid of predictable content as to violate ruleoflaw 
precepts is a rather stunning indictment, (although Stucke goes on to 
argue only for rather modest improvements at the margins of rule of 
reason doctrine).136 
Others have described the Board of Trade standard as “hardly 
illuminating,”137 and as having “‘legitimiz[ed] the ‘big case’ in 
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antitrust.”138 It would be a challenge to find a legal standard that has 
endured as long as Board of Trade’s rule of reason against so much 
scholarly objection from so many different points of view. A full 
catalogue of Board of Trade’s detractors would be difficult to assemble. 
The reader is invited to locate commentary championing the Brandeis 
standard. It works for no one. 
B. A CRITIQUE OF CAL. DENTAL 
The Cal. Dental decision ought to have drawn at least as much 
scholarly criticism as Board of Trade. It drains rule of reason analysis of 
content, aggravates the already excessive costs of antitrust litigation and 
compliance, relies on the improbable force of stare decisis for future 
clarification of its empty standard, and bizarrely disregards established 
law and policy against defending restraints on the ground that 
competition does not work in a particular industrial context. 
1. Cal. Dental’s “Competition Doesn’t Work” Analysis 
A troubling aspect of the analysis in Cal. Dental is that the Court 
strained to accept an argument that flies in the face of sound policy and 
previously unyielding precedent. The defense in Cal. Dental was that 
unfettered price competition by dentists, given the peculiarities of their 
business, would not work to consumers’ benefit and might actually harm 
them.139 The Court indulged this defense at length, ultimately agreeing 
with the dentists that price competition in their industry might not 
work.140 Noting the asymmetry of information between consumers and 
suppliers in the market for dental services, and leaning heavily on the 
“professional context,” the Court concluded that a horizontal agreement 
to restrict price advertising might, in the mind of the conspirators (i.e., 
the California Dental Association), spur consumers to consume more 
rather than fewer dental services.141 Justice Souter reasoned that the 
Association’s self-imposed prohibition of discount advertising “appears 
to reflect the prediction that any costs to competition associated with the 
elimination of across-the-board advertising will be outweighed by gains 
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to consumer information (and hence competition) created by discount 
advertising that is exact, accurate, and more easily verifiable (at least by 
regulators).”142 Thus, at least the conspirators’ purpose might have been 
a benign one (although there was no evidence to that effect), but many 
industries honestly believe competition for them is rueful.143 Proof that 
competition is a bad idea for this or that particular industry has never 
been admissible in antitrust cases.144 Still, Justice Souter chastised the 
Ninth circuit for ignoring “the possibility that the particular restrictions 
on professional advertising could have different effects from those 
‘normally’ found in the commercial world . . .”145 thus accepting the 
possibility that dentistry is an industry where price competition does not 
work. 
This is precisely the defense based on a frontal assault on 
competition itself which the case law has roundly and soundly rejected. 
Society of Professional Engineers involved a similar, and more 
compelling defense.146 That case involved a challenge to a professional 
society’s ethical rule “prohibiting the submission of any form of price 
information to a prospective customer which would enable that 
customer to make a price comparison on engineering services.”147 Civil 
engineers’ “study, design, and construction of all types of improvements 
to real property—bridges, office buildings, airports, and factories are 
examples.”148 In defense of that price advertising ban, it was argued that 
public safety was imperiled by free and unfettered price competition; 
i.e., that “competition among professional engineers was contrary to the 
public interest.”149 Civil engineers, if allowed to compete on price, might 
submit low-ball bids to obtain contracts and then be forced to oversee 
public works projects that were inadequately budgeted.150 There 
defendants mounted a nearly identical argument to that of the California 
Dental Association: that price competition in that particular industry 
would not work because competition would lead to unethical deceptive 
practices and because “engineering projects may be inherently imprecise 
and incapable of taking into account all the variables which will be 
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involved in the actual performance of the project.”151 Justice Stevens’ 
opinion laid bare that defense: “The early cases also foreclose the 
argument that because of the special characteristics of a particular 
industry, monopolistic arrangements will better promote trade and 
commerce than competition.”152 The Society’s defense “on the basis of 
the potential threat that competition poses to the public safety and the 
ethics of its profession is nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic 
policy of the Sherman Act.”153 In other words, “competition does not 
work” is not a defense. This same defense was rejected again 
unambiguously in FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.154 There, a 
dentists’ professional association argued that quality of care would be 
compromised if dentists were free to compete as to what information 
they would supply to payment plans in support of authorization 
requests.155 Again, the Court said: “The argument is, in essence, that an 
unrestrained market in which consumers are given access to the 
information they believe to be relevant to their choices will lead them to 
make unwise and even dangerous choices. Such an argument amounts to 
‘nothing less than a frontal assault on the basic policy of the Sherman 
Act.’”156 These “competition does not work” arguments are 
indistinguishable from the one the Court accepted in Cal. Dental. 
If dentistry cannot be practiced ethically in a competitive 
marketplace, an industry antitrust exemption could be sought from 
Congress;157 it was inappropriate for the Court to overrule the Sherman 
Act itself as applied to a particular industry practice. The Court has done 
so only once, for professional baseball, with questionable wisdom, and 
Congress eventually reacted to undo much of the damage.158 With the 
exception of professional baseball, whose antitrust exemption traces 
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back to an earlier era of commerce clause doctrine coupled with 
perceived congressional acquiescence over time, no industry has ever 
been singled out by the Court for specialized antitrust immunity.159 As 
Justice Stevens pointed out in Professional Engineers, “this Court has 
never accepted such an argument.”160 
Moreover, by opening the door to industry-specific arguments 
against the desirability of price competition, the Court opened a 
Pandora’s box, further contributing to the uncertainty and 
unpredictability of the rule of reason.161 If dentistry is an industry not fit 
for price competition, what about the practice of law (where there is 
asymmetry of information between buyers and sellers coupled with the 
complexity of services that dwarfs anything in dentistry); or funeral 
services; health care generally; and so on? One sound reason for the 
holding in Professional Engineers is that the courts are ill-suited to 
become public utility commissions deciding the proper organization of 
every industry in the American and global economies.162 Cal. Dental 
took an ill-advised step toward remaking antitrust rules on an industry-
specific basis, and indeed forging exemptions in response to industry 
complaints that competition is a bad idea for them.163 
2. Expanded Litigation Burdens and Social Costs 
By demanding “an enquiry meet for the case,” Cal. Dental reflects 
the court’s continuing trend toward imposing ever greater burdens on 
antitrust plaintiffs in the interest of avoiding “false positives” so that 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Non-statutory antitrust exemptions have been recognized by the courts for 
certain categories of conduct, but, aside from professional baseball, not for specific 
industries. Compare Keogh v. Chi. & N.W. Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922) (generally 
exempting filed tariff rates from antitrust treble damages claims, without regard to any 
specific inductry), with Flood, 407 U.S. 258 (reaffirming special industry antitrust 
exemption for major league baseball); 15 U.S.C § 26b (limiting and codifying a special 
industry exemption for baseball). 
 160. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 694 (1978). 
 161. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 771-73 (1999). 
 162. 435 U.S. at 695-96 (“Exceptions to the Sherman Act for potentially dangerous 
goods and services would be tantamount to a repeal of the statute. In our complex 
economy, the number of items that may cause serious harm is almost endless—
automobiles, drugs, foods, aircraft components, heavy equipment, and countless others, 
cause serious harm to individuals or to the public at large if defectively made. The 
judiciary cannot indirectly protect the public against this harm by conferring monopoly 
privileges on the manufacturers.”). 
 163. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 773. 
620 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
case outcomes can better align with the economic objectives of 
antitrust.164 The per se rules and abbreviated “look” rules can 
theoretically yield the wrong result in particular cases, possibly 
discouraging or penalizing procompetitive conduct –- although the 
extent to which per se rules have ever actually discouraged desirable 
conduct is a matter of pure speculation.165 By expanding the contexts in 
which antitrust defendants may advance evidence of economic 
efficiency justifications, the Court invites a potentially extensive 
economics-based inquiry to test whether a particular restraint, in its 
market context, might on balance benefit consumers.166 This is why the 
Court has abandoned per se rules that previously condemned vertical 
price fixing and vertical territorial restraints.167 As the Court noted in 
overturning the per se rule against maximum resale price fixing, “we 
have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to ‘restraints 
imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic 
impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.’” 168 
However, there are considerable economic costs that result from the 
shift from categorical per se rules to a more elaborate and less definite 
rule of reason analysis.169 This is especially true because Cal. Dental 
abandoned any clear categorical approach and opened wide the rule of 
reason to an infinite range of standards.170 Business planning, public and 
private enforcement and judicial decisions all have become more 
complex and costly.171 
Cal. Dental’s negative impact on antitrust compliance cannot be 
overstated. It is a truism that antitrust compliance efforts benefit 
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consumers at considerably less social cost than antitrust litigation – a 
stitch in time saves nine. Businesses attempting to conform their conduct 
to the law need to know what the rules are – in advance. Risk-averse 
companies tend to avoid conduct if legal counsel cannot assure its 
lawfulness. Antitrust rules that are unclear, unpredictable and uncertain 
thus tend to to discourage desirable conduct as well as undesirable 
conduct. A risk-averse and well-counseled company, having no basis for 
predicting how much or what sort of analysis a court might someday 
apply to evaluate the lawfulness of its conduct, will tend to steer clear of 
conduct that has anticompetitive elements but which a court might or 
might not find to produce net competitive benefits.172 Under the 
uncertainty created by Cal. Dental, predicting the outcome of an 
antitrust case that might be filed at some the future point would often 
require advance knowledge of such things as the relevant market 
definition that a court would ultimately accept for the case.173 Corporate 
legal counsel cannot engage in detailed relevant market analysis ex ante, 
at least not the way litigants do in litigation with the aid of economics 
expertise and at an enormous expense.174 Viewed from an economics 
perspective, the cost of making accurate predictions about conduct that 
is lawful but close to the line of legality – conduct that should not be 
discouraged – exceeds the expected returns.175 
Consequently, the “false positives” that the Supreme Court has so 
assiduously sought to prevent have to some degree merely shifted from 
the court room to the board room. The very leniency of modern antitrust 
law is buried in the obscurity and unpredictability of a rule of reason. 
Perversely, only the less risk averse firms will fail to be deterred from 
beneficial conduct, the very firms that will feel equally at liberty to 
indulge in harmful conduct.176 
Antitrust enforcement is also hampered by Cal. Dental’s open-
endedness. Enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs need to know 
what is permitted and what is not, which cases to pursue and which ones 
not to. Evaluating a particular enforcement initiative should not be a 
matter of guesswork. Just as vague rules discourage desirable business 
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conduct, uncertainty likewise begets agency reluctance to bring 
desirable cases.177 
Of course, vague antitrust rules impose significant burdens on the 
courts.178 Courts expend considerable amounts of scarce resources on 
rule of reason antitrust litigation.179 As the Supreme Court noted in 
Superior Court Trial Lawyers, among other cases: “The administrative 
efficiency interests in antitrust regulation are unusually compelling. The 
per se rules avoid ‘the necessity for an incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large 
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.’”180 True, a court 
can apply a truncated rule of reason if it finds it appropriate and thus 
avoid some of the protracted litigation.181 However, Cal. Dental and 
cases in its wake have done very little to explain the circumstances that 
should trigger abbreviated analyses, nor have these cases defined the 
extent of appropriate abbreviation.182 It is not unusual for trial courts to 
find their “incredibly complicated and prolonged” antitrust trial results 
reversed on appeal precisely because the trial engaged in too much or 
too little rule of reason evaluation of defendants’ conduct.183 Cal. Dental 
is a good example. 
Cal. Dental’s case-by-case approach thus relegates Section 1 
analysis to the very “shifting, vague and indeterminate” standard that 
Judge Taft cautioned against more than 100 years ago.184 The decision 
trumpets case-specific, individually-tailored, review to help ensure 
correct outcomes in particular cases at the expense of efficiency, 
predictability and uniformity in the administration of antitrust law.185 
Trial courts are directed not to fall prey to regarding rule of reason 
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analysis as a “spectrum” of adequate reasonableness analysis, but at the 
same time admonished to find the right degree of reasonable analysis 
among the infinite possibilities.186 Although there rather obviously is a 
spectrum of adequate analyses, the Court’s warning about the term 
“spectrum” as a metaphor is that the term “spectrum,” borrowed as it is 
from the scientific terminology of optics, suggests too much clarity, 
thereby deceptively suggesting “more precision than we can hope for.” 
All hope of precision is abandoned. 
3. The Empty Promise of Stare Decisis 
The Court seemed to acknowledge the need for transparency in the 
law, but resorted to a peculiar and unlikely mechanism to achieve even a 
small measure of it. Citing Professor Areeda, the Court acknowledged 
the “necessity, particularly great in the quasi-common law realm of 
antitrust, that courts explain the logic of their conclusions. By exposing 
their reasoning, judges . . . are subjected to others’ critical analyses, 
which in turn can lead to better understanding for the future.”187 To 
achieve an increasingly predictable standard, Justice Souter thought that 
transparency in judicial decisions would create a body of case law that 
would eliminate ambiguity and doubt over time.188 Justice Souter’s 
vision is for a future in which the accumulated experience of courts will 
eventually bring order as similar cases beget similar results after 
receiving similar levels of review.189 The emergence of a body of well-
reasoned and fully-articulated decisional law is anticipated to make 
antitrust decision making easier over time.190 “The object is to see 
whether the experience of the market has been so clear, or necessarily 
will be, that a confident conclusion about the principal tendency of a 
restriction will follow from a quick (or at least quicker) look, in place of 
a more sedulous one. And of course what we see may vary over time, if 
rule of reason analyses in case after case reach identical conclusions.”191 
This seems fanciful at best. The rule of reason is now 100 years old 
and the promise of clarification through judicial application has proven 
to be empty.192 The rule’s purported standard is devoid of substantive 
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content that could guide judges to apply it consistently so that patterns 
could emerge.193 Not only has the Court failed to give content to this 
legal standard, but it has indulged in shifting the standard around in 
response to the economic theory du jour.194 Consider Cal. Dental: The 
Sherman Act was already more than 100 years old when the Court made 
a major adjustment to the application of the rule of reason.195 
In fact, stare decisis has not been a particularly strong force of 
stability in any aspect of antitrust jurisprudence.196 The most unsettled 
period of antitrust law has been within the past three decades, which 
have brought outright reversals of at least three longstanding antitrust 
rules,197 and a sea of change in the policy underpinnings that the Court 
attributes to the statute.198 Time-honored conceptions about predatory 
pricing have been relegated to history,199 per se rules of equally 
impressive vintage have been overruled,200 case law precedents from the 
heyday of merger enforcement have been roundly repudiated,201 and 
even the procedural rules for testing antirust complaints have been 
upended.202 
Even if antitrust rules had more staying power, experience has 
shown that “similar” cases do not exist when every aspect of context is 
allowed to be taken into account, so that the promise that similar cases 
will yield a coherent body of law is unattainable.203 The vast universe of 
economic activity takes place in infinitely varying market contexts that 
may arguably have different likely effects in different markets at 
different times. For example, a fully and transparently explained judicial 
condemnation of an agreement among cast iron pipe producers 
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representing 40% of their relevant markets in 2010 to refuse to produce 
products responsive to an amendment in the applicable safety code will 
shed no light on an agreement among 18% of aluminum can producers 
to do the “same thing” in 2020, let alone an agreement among patent 
licensors in the pharmaceutical market for certain blood pressure 
medications to do the “same thing” in 2050. In fact, it is not clear that 
any two conspiracies really “do the same thing” if all aspects of their 
respective contexts are weighed into the mix. 
Cal. Dental itself is a case in point. There the Court managed to 
find reason to expect procompetitive net effects from a horizontal 
agreement among dentists to suppress advertising of discounts, thus 
requiring a “more sedulous” look than the true “quick look” analysis 
that had been applied by the Ninth Circuit.204 Prior to Cal. Dental, it 
seemed clear beyond dispute that an agreement among rival 
professionals to refrain from price competition by suppressing price 
information was subject to summary condemnation under a “quick look” 
analysis;205 and that an agreement among professionals that went further 
to coordinate price terms was per se unlawful.206 Yet a bare majority on 
the Court found the dentist’s agreement not to advertise such things as 
across-the-board discounts required more analysis.207 This is indicative 
of the problem. Cases cannot establish rules if they are all 
distinguishable on their facts. 
Certainly, since Cal. Dental there has been no discernible trend in 
antitrust decisions that gives life to Justice Souter’s notion that an 
infinitely variable rule of reason would eventually settle into predictable 
pockets as similar cases begat similar analyses and results.208 
4. Aggravation of the Board of Trade Relevancy Problems 
Another problem with Cal. Dental is that it managed to further 
obscure a rule that was already so inclusive of relevant factors as to 
exclude almost nothing from consideration. Board of Trade instructs that 
the relevant evidence in a rule of reason case includes the history of the 
industry, its condition before the restraint was imposed and afterwards, 
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facts that are peculiar to the business that might set the restraint on a 
different footing than in some other industry or business, the nature of 
the restraint, the purposes behind the imposition of the restraint 
including the problems it was intended to solve.209 All of this opens 
nearly everything to relevance. As one observer stated: “Justice 
Brandeis’ statement of the rule of reason in Chicago Board of Trade . . . 
has been one of the most damaging in the annals of antitrust. The 
statement has suggested to many lower courts that, if the analysis is 
under the rule of reason, then nearly everything is relevant.”210 
5. Impairment of Settlements 
Settlement is more difficult under uncertainty about what “enquiry 
is meet for the case.” The substantive law of antitrust should facilitate 
reasonable settlements because they avoid the high costs of litigation, 
through trial and appeal, while vindicating the objectives of antitrust 
law. Most antitrust cases settle, 211 but that does not mean that they settle 
early, or that the terms of settlement are reasonable. Indeed, the 
Supreme Court has expressed frustration that the huge exposures 
defendants face in antitrust cases can force them to pay extortionate 
amounts to settle weak cases just to keep them from heading into the 
unpredictable waters of a jury trial.212 
However, what the Supreme Court has not addressed are the 
reasons why defendants might regard those waters as riddled with reefs 
and shoals.213 The unpredictability of antitrust litigation under the rule of 
reason is at least a contributor to this phenomenon.214 In rule of reason 
cases counsel for each side have only a relatively weak basis for 
predicting how elaborate and costly the litigation will be and what 
outcome is most likely – both of which are much clearer in per se cases. 
Although plaintiffs may only rarely win rule of reason cases, that is cold 
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comfort to a defendant faced with a small but unpredictable risk of 
enormous liability exposure. So the defendant-friendly rule of reason is 
in tension with one of its very objectives, leaving defendants with 
unpredictable outcomes and large exposures and thus actually promoting 
so-called extortionate settlements and prolonging litigation. 
6. Anti-Plaintiff Bias 
Plaintiffs necessarily bear the burden of proof of their case at trial. 
In the absence of a settlement, the variable rule of reason goes on to 
create problems for the plaintiff’s presentation of its case: How much 
“enquiry is meet?”215 A plaintiff cannot with assurance know what to 
allege or when to rest, since the amount of evidence that it must present 
in order to prove the contours of the relevant market, the defendants’ 
market power, etc., are unknowable. Cal. Dental sets a trap for the 
unwary, and more or less assures unwitting mistakes. The Court’s bias 
against private plaintiffs has barely been concealed, exposed by such 
references as “extortionate” settlements and the like. Even if one 
accepted the Court’s apparently dim view of private antitrust plaintiffs, 
the rule of reason applies equally to governmental enforcement. 
For example, the FTC lost the Cal. Dental case because it failed to 
prove enough about the relevant market, instead relying on the court to 
take a “quick look” approach since the challenged conduct involved an 
agreement not to advertise discounts.216 Agreements by rivals not to 
compete via discount advertising seems like a familiar enough context, 
but the Supreme Court speculated that consumers might consume more 
dental services with such a restraint in place and on that basis required 
more proof than the FTC had presented.217 Yet the Court left no sign 
posts that could guide future litigants. 
The elephant in the room is the fact that plaintiffs rarely pursue, 
and even more rarely win, rule of reason cases.218 As Posner pointed out 
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“[t]he content of the rule of reason is largely unknown; in practice it is 
little more than a euphemism for nonliablity.”219 Similarly, Lemley and 
Leslie observe that the “conventional wisdom is that vertical restraints 
evaluated under the rule of reason are essentially de facto per se legal 
since rule of reason cases are notoriously difficult for plaintiffs to 
win.”220 The Court’s shift away from per se rules toward an open-ended 
rule of reason is consistent with its broader pro-business agenda.221 The 
Court’s unconcealed view is that Type I errors are generally to be 
preferred over Type II;222 meaning that it is preferable to give a violator 
a pass than to condemn possible innocence. The rule of reason, as 
applied in this policy context, is generally a loss for plaintiffs, at least 
insofar as the rule of reason is a “little more than a euphemism for 
nonliablity.”223 
A scant few cases like Polygram224 and North Texas Specialty 
Physicians225 stand as notable exceptions, but these were cases brought 
by a public enforcement agency and represent stand-out exceptions to 
Posner’s observation that rule of reason equates generally to 
nonliability. Plaintiffs faced with this burden are likely to forego 
litigation because they “simply cannot afford” the investment in rule of 
reason cases.226 The litigation burden of defining relevant markets, 
establishing market power and proving anticompetitive marketplace 
effects exceeds the abilities and finances of many litigants.227 The 
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Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that a rule of reason inquiry in 
litigation imposes “the necessity for an incredibly complicated and 
prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at large 
whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable.”228 
7. An Analytical Critique of the Rule of Reason – Gaps and 
Inconsistencies 
It should therefore not be surprising that the case law applying the 
rule of reason and its more abbreviated variants has not only failed to 
live up to its promise of a transparent body of decisional law, but has 
instead left wide-open gaps on a number of central issues. A full century 
after the rule of reason was first announced, courts, scholars and 
enforcement agencies continue to offer divergent articulations of some 
of the most fundamental rule of reason issues. 
First, it is not even clear when the rule of reason fully applies. 
Following Cal. Dental, it is no longer helpful to say that the rule of 
reason is the default,229 because there is no longer a clear delineation 
between that rule and per se illegality. All that is certain when a per se 
rule is not applicable is that some level of analysis is then required – but 
how much? And more importantly, in what cases must a truly full-blown 
case be made? Second, it is unclear whether, and at what stage of the 
case, a plaintiff is required to establish market power. Finally, there is no 
definitive distinction drawn in case law between actual and merely 
theoretical and conjectural effects. It is thus uncertain whether and when 
a party is put to the burden of proving actual effects rather than 
theorizing them without evidence of actual marketplace impact. 
These represent enormous shortcomings. The decision to subject a 
plaintiff’s case to anything like a full-blown rule of reason analysis can 
have decisive implications for many antitrust cases, as does the 
imposition of a burden to establish the defendants’ collective market 
power.230 Conversely, if a defendant must defend by establishing that 
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actual procompetitive virtues of offsetting value have benefitted 
consumers, that is a very different burden than merely presenting a 
theoretical case that the conduct under challenge might have a plausible 
tendency to foster efficiencies and consumer benefits.231 
These gaps cannot be blamed on Cal. Dental, but instead combined 
with the open-endedness of the Cal. Dental rule of reason to lend 
intolerable opacity and unpredictability to antitrust law. No one disputes 
the enormous difference in cost and complexity between a per se or 
even quick-look case and a more full-blown rule of reason case.232 Nor 
ought it be argued that antitrust analysis should be structured to deter the 
very private enforcement that Section 4 of the Clayton Act was 
specifically tailored to encourage via the mechanism of trebling 
damages.233 Yet a litigant or court heading into a case that does not 
involve hard-core cartel activity often has no way of predicting the 
course the case might take, how complex or costly the case will be, nor 
the likelihood of success.234 It is self-evident that this state of the law 
inherently discourages private filings. The current doctrine governing 
the evaluation of restraints is thus not only unruly, but contrary to the 
clear intent of the law. 
 
C. UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES DOES THE  
FULL-BLOWN RULE OF REASON APPLY? 
 
Perhaps the most basic issue that lacks a consistent and 
comprehensive approach is the determination of what sorts of cases 
merit fulsome rule of reason analysis and what sorts of cases merit 
something more cursory. The introduction of Cal. Dental’s sliding scale, 
with its obliteration of categorical analysis, makes this even more 
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obscure, because the question is no longer simply “Rule of reason or per 
se?” but rather “Rule of reason, per se or something else?” Where along 
this infinite continuum does a case belong? This question has vexed the 
courts, leading them in a variety of directions. 
Recently, for example, the Ninth Circuit articulated a standard of 
review that it dubbed “a per se-plus-or- quick-look-minus” analysis, 
“somewhere between pure per se and pure quick look.”235 In California 
v. Safeway, the Ninth Circuit wrestled at length with deciding whether 
an agreement by supermarkets to pool profits was illegal per se or 
should instead be subjected to more penetrating inquiry.236 Forty years 
ago the Supreme Court stated without qualification that “[p]ooling of 
profits pursuant to an inflexible ratio . . . runs afoul of the Sherman 
Act,” deeming the practice unlawful without elaboration.237 Every case 
to ever consider the matter had likewise condemned naked profit sharing 
arrangements among horizontal rivals.238 The Ninth Circuit 
distinguished the earlier cases on various grounds, including whether the 
defendants had market power and whether their arrangement was an 
enduring one or one of short duration.239 However, resort to these 
distinctions found no support in the controlling precedents.240 A short-
lived per se violation is no less a per se violation because the 
irrebuttable presumption of harm has never been limited to restraints of 
any particular duration.241 Moreover, the only purpose of the profit-
sharing arrangement in Safeway was to avoid competition during labor 
strife.242 The point was to block the labor union’s divide-and-conquer 
strategy by preventing any of the supermarkets from taking competitive 
advantage if one of its rivals was struck, and it was not.243 It is 
impossible to find any consumer benefit that could flow from such a 
temporary hiatus from price competition. 
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The Ninth Circuit’s drive to create another obscure label for 
gauging analytical depth under the circumstances of the Safeway case 
points to the problem. There is no real measure anymore. There are no 
categories with any substance. The problem with the infinite possibilities 
posited by Cal. Dental is that there is no agreement in any corner about 
how to decide what standard applies in a given case. “An enquiry meet 
for the case” is not a legal standard — it merely begs one. 
Thus after 100 years, we are not simply litigating whether a 
particular case falls under per se rules or the rule of reason, but more 
fundamentally what sorts of cases should be condemned only after a 
full-blown inquiry, what sorts only after a quick but more “sedulous” 
inquiry, what sorts after just a very brief look and what sorts after no 
look at all once the conspiracy itself is established. Seemingly familiar 
categories of restraints, including conspiracies to prevent price and 
discount advertising (in Cal. Dental), profit pooling by rivals (in 
Safeway), to refrain from price competition (in PolyGram) and others 
are now open to an expansive array of issues that at one time would 
have been thought to be foreclosed. Categories of conduct with 
predictable anticompetitive effects have been blurred, creating the 
expansive role for indeterminate rule of reason analysis. 
1. Full-Blown Rule of Reason in Supreme Court Cases 
One reason, among others, that the rule of reason remains so 
obscure is that the Supreme Court has declined to articulate affirmative 
criteria for its full-blown application. Instead, it has relied on treating 
full-blown rule of reason as the default analysis to be applied unless the 
case presents certain attributes that eliminate or reduce the need to 
inquire into competitive effects of the alleged restraint.244 Where certain 
contextual traits surround the restraint, it is removed to some extent 
from full-blown review. By extension, then, the absence of these traits 
might require the application of a full-blown analysis. 
It might be helpful if the categories of restraint that require truly 
full-blown analysis could be identified. The per se categories of 
horizontal price fixing, market allocations, and output limitations are 
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reasonably clear, even if the Court has obscured even these categories in 
cases like BMI. If the ends of the Cal. Dental spectrum were clarified, 
that would be an improvement. 
However, a review of the traits that can be identified as triggering 
full-blown rule of reason analysis leaves unclear whether these traits are 
necessary or even sufficient for the removal of a matter from full-blown 
analysis. 
a. Facially Anticompetitive Naked Restraints 
One trait that removes a case from full-blown rule of reason 
analysis is where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of 
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have 
an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”245 The decision to 
apply the per se rule turns on “whether the practice facially appears to 
be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output . . . or instead one designed to increase economic 
efficiency and render markets more, rather than less, competitive.”246 In 
Cal. Dental, the court explained that a truncated or “quick look” rule of 
reason analysis is appropriate in cases presenting restraints with obvious 
anticompetitive potential. Thus the court referred to its prior cases in 
which it had applied a truncated rule of reason analysis to condemn 
certain types of conduct summarily. These included a dentists’ concerted 
refusal to provide insurance companies with requested x-rays, which 
was deemed “a horizontal agreement among the participating dentists to 
withhold from their customers a particular service that they desire;”247 an 
agreement among civil engineers to refuse to discuss price terms with 
customers;248 and the NCAA’s restriction on the number of football 
games for which member colleges could sell television rights.249 
Thus, one might surmise that a full-blown rule of reason analysis 
would be appropriate where an observer with a rudimentary 
understanding of economics cannot conclude with confidence that the 
conduct is anticompetitive. 
This particular attribute has eluded consistent application because 
in practice observers with more than just a “rudimentary” economics 
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comprehension do not seem to agree. For example, in Cal. Dental itself, 
the FTC, the Ninth Circuit, Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Stevens and 
Ginsburg, and the majority opinion signatories all disagreed about 
whether the agreement was facially invalid and on how much analysis 
was required to draw a conclusion. Indeed, two of the FTC 
Commissioners disagreed with the per se analysis of Chairman 
Pitofsky’s opinion. The Commission (majority) regarded the agreement 
as per se unlawful on the basis of an unbroken line of cases treating 
agreements restricting price advertising as equivalent to price fixing.250 
As Chairman Pitofsky observed: “This effective prohibition on truthful 
and nondeceptive advertising of low fees and across-the-board discounts 
constitutes a naked attempt to eliminate price competition and must be 
judged unlawful per se.”251 The Ninth Circuit retreated from per se 
analysis on the ground that the restraint was an ethical rule imposed by a 
professional society.252 Given this context, coupled with the fact that a 
naked restriction on price advertising was involved, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded the “quick look” or truncated rule of reason analysis sufficed 
to support the FTC’s ultimate condemnation of the rule. This approach 
also found support, since Indiana Federation of Dentists similarly 
involved a professional group’s imposition of a naked restraint thus 
prompting quick-look review. A bare majority of the Supreme Court 
found “quick” was too abbreviated and thus demanded further “more 
sedulous” inquiry to determine whether the rule might have been 
competitively justified. However, in so analyzing the problem, the 
majority appears to have deviated from fundamental antitrust orthodoxy 
that a restraint cannot be defended on the ground that competition is a 
bad idea for a particular industry or business. The justification was that 
if dentists were left freely to compete with price advertising, consumers 
would be too unsophisticated to benefit and might on balance be harmed 
by the practice. Thus unfettered competition might be harmful, and a 
horizontal restraint to prevent the harm was sufficiently promising to 
require more than a quick-look review. The dissenting justices disagreed 
and found that the association’s rule could not pass muster even under a 
rule of reason analysis. 
Thus the Supreme Court’s reliance on “rudimentary” economics 
understanding is misplaced. Without more guidance, this purported 
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standard fails to yield consistent, predictable outcomes in even the 
familiar context of price-advertising restraints. This standard for 
removing a case from full-blown rule of reason analysis is essentially 
useless in practice. 
 
b. Ancillary Restraints: The Absence of Economic  
Integration Related to the Challenged Restraint 
 
Another trait that has led the Supreme Court to remove a matter 
from full-blown rule of reason review is the absence of some measure of 
economic integration relating to the restraint. This is essentially the 
ancillary restraints rule that derives from the common law, and was 
made an enduring part of antitrust jurisprudence by Judge Taft in 
Addyston Pipe.253 
Despite its incomplete coverage, this doctrine is relatively clear and 
useful in detaching certain collaborations from unduly harsh antitrust 
scrutiny. While there are always going to be cases that are more difficult 
than others to resolve, it is often clear whether a restraint is part of some 
legitimate activity, and, if so, whether it is reasonably tailored to the 
achievement of legitimate objectives. 
Does the presence of some economic integration then yield a 
meaningful and clear category of restraints that fall within the full-
blown rule of reason? The ancillary restraints doctrine has no bearing on 
how much analysis is required in order to balance the legitimate 
objectives behind a restraint against its anticompetitive effects. Put 
somewhat differently, this doctrine says nothing about where on the Cal. 
Dental continuum to place a particular case. Rather, the doctrine merely 
dislodges some cases from per se analysis. 
c. Questionable Economic Self-Interest 
Per se analysis has in certain cases been reserved for conspiratorial 
conduct that is in the economic self-interest of the conspirators. This is 
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not a rule that has found much useful application. In United States v. 
Brown University,254 the Third Circuit applied a full rule of reason to an 
agreement among universities setting common financial aid awards for 
needy students. On its face, the restraint had attributes of price fixing, 
since the universities were plainly competing for high-quality students 
in the categories affected by the restraint, and fixing one dimension of 
their competitive efforts. Agreement on how much to “pay” these 
students (or discount their tuition) substantially limited the “price” 
dimension of this competition.255 The Antitrust Division had thus 
pursued the case as a per se violation akin to price fixing. The Third 
Circuit declined to apply the per se rule, noting that unlike cases such as 
National Soc. of Professional Engineers v. United States256 and FTC v. 
Indiana Federation of Dentists,257 the universities had no economic self-
interest at stake.258 That is, in the absence of the agreement, each school 
would have expended the same amount on financial assistance to 
students. Thus, the agreement was unlike common price fixing, which 
alters the competitors’ economic outcomes.259 
The Supreme Court endorsed the “self-interested” restraint 
distinction in Cal. Dental, citing Brown University.260 In a similar vein 
are cases declining to apply per se rules in the context of professional 
services markets. The court has adhered to the view that professions are 
not entirely profit-driven, so that professional conduct should generally 
not be condemned under per se rules. “The public service aspect, and 
other features of the professions, may require that a particular practice, 
which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in 
another context, be treated differently.”261 Thus per se rules are 
inapplicable where the economic incentives of the alleged conspirators 
cannot be presumed to be self-interested, because the actors are 
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professionals imbued with a public interest, because the activity has 
overtones of charity, or for some other reason. 
This criterion only has narrow application and it also lacks certainty 
or predictability because there are cases that are flatly inconsistent with 
it or at least cast doubt on its universal applicability. The presumption in 
Cal. Dental that professionals are not economically self-interested is 
facially implausible, and runs counter to the application of per se rules 
in Superior Court Trial Lawyers262 and Maricopa County Medical 
Society.263 If doctors could be presumed to have less interest than 
average in economic self-interest it would seem unnecessary for the 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission to promulgate an 
entire set of antitrust guidelines just for their industry.264 Self-interested 
restraint of competition among professionals is hardly aberrational. 
Additionally, even if the absence of economic self interest could 
guide cases away from the per se rules, that still does not indicate where 
on the continuum of rule of reason analysis to place a restraint. 
Thus, none of these categories shed much light on whether, in the 
context of a particular case, Cal. Dental would support a full-blown rule 
of reason analysis. The criteria that can be extracted from precedent are 
sparse, seem to apply inconsistently, and offer little predictive power. 
The exception is the ancillary restraint doctrine, which has the virtues of 
being fairly clear and predictable, but it lacks the virtue of resolving 
very many cases that arise under Section 1. 
After 100 years, it therefore remains the case that the courts have 
provided no reasonably predictable framework for determining just 
which cases are required to be evaluated fully under the rule of reason. 
This ought to be regarded as a very important failing.265 
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2. Is Market Power an Essential Element of a Rule of Reason 
Case? 
Possibly the most important turn of events in a rule of reason case 
is when the judge decides whether a plaintiff’s burden includes proof of 
market power, yet the case law is inconsistent as to whether and when 
proof of market power is a requisite element of a plaintiff’s antitrust 
conspiracy case. 266 Also unclear are basic matters about what sort of 
proof is required, how much market power is relevant and, indeed, the 
meaning of the term itself. 267 These are critical issues because of the 
cost, complexity and inherent tilt toward defendants that is implicit in 
making market power an element of a plaintiff’s case.268 
It is understandable why courts sometimes require plaintiffs to 
establish defendants’ market power as an element of their case, since 
antitrust is fundamentally concerned with the power of market 
participants to distort markets and misallocate resources. If the 
defendants lack the economic power to bring about anticompetitive 
results, a private damages case is a waste of the parties’ and the public’s 
resources, regardless of the conduct involved.269 There is no question 
that market power is in many cases a critical issue that must be resolved 
by the tribunal. 
However, as a practical matter, proof of market power is often the 
single most complex and expensive part of an antitrust case.270 It is also 
                                                                                                                 
 266. See Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in Antitrust Rule of 
Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 46 (2000); see also 
Frank H. Easterbrook, Allocating Antitrust Decisionmaking Tasks, 76 GEO. L.J. 305, 
312 (1987). 
 267. See Graphic Prods. Distribs., Inc. v. Itek Corp., 717 F.2d 1560, 1570 (11th Cir. 
1983) (“Market power is not well suited to presentation in an adversary proceeding.”); 
Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Imps., Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 268. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 275 at 39 (“Given the difficulties of proving 
market power and even of defining a market, it is not clear that the interests of litigation 
are best served by requiring a showing of market power.”); see also Piraino, supra note 
33, at 1754 (“Even in recent years, plaintiffs have been reluctant to bring a rule of 
reason case because its evidentiary hurdles are so difficult to meet. It is particularly 
burdensome for a plaintiff to prove that a defendant has sufficient market power to 
adversely affect competition in the relevant market.”). 
 269. The same does not hold true in criminal prosecutions. A conspiracy, once 
formed, violates the Sherman Act, and it is not a defense that the unlawful conspiracy 
would not have achieved its objectives. Moreover, the types of cases brought under the 
rule of reason are not prosecuted criminally. 
 270. See supra notes 128, 274. 
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rife with potholes for plaintiffs, and with opportunities for guilty 
defendants to evade liability because of the plaintiffs’ burden of 
persuasion on the murky and contestable issues involved. Proof of 
market power will frequently involve detailed analysis of the proper 
definition of the relevant product and geographic markets;271 the 
defendant’s market share;272 the identities and market shares of other 
existing market participants;273 entry conditions and trends;274 the 
identity, proximity and relative strength of potential entrants;275 
consumer substitution and cross-elasticities of demand;276 supply-side 
substitution;277 as well as inferences from subjective sources such as 
from the internal documents of market participants and opinions of 
expert observers.278 Economics experts are easily (if expensively) hired 
to disagree on nearly every aspect of this jigsaw puzzle of issues.279 
Drawing a conclusion about the ability of defendants collectively to alter 
                                                                                                                 
 271. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470 (1992) 
(“[M]arket definition generally determines the result of the case.”); see also Robert 
Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, 90 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1805, 1806-13 (1990). 
 272. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470. 
 273. Realcomp II, Ltd. v. FTC, 635 F.3d 815, 829 (6th Cir. 2011); see also JOE S. 
BAIN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 8 (2d ed. 1968) (“The condition of entry . . . 
determines the relative force of potential competition as an influence or regulator on the 
conduct and performance of sellers already established in a market.”). 
 274. See Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(“The courts generally allow the defendant to rebut inferences of market power by 
showing easy entry conditions.”) (citing and quoting 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 532a (1995)). 
 275. United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 628 (1974) (“The 
sight of a particular firm ‘waiting at the market’s edge’ may emphasize the entry threat, 
but it is ease of entry, not necessarily an identifiable potential entrant, that limits present 
market power by reminding existing firms that high profits will attract outsiders.”) 
(citing and quoting PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS ¶ 517 (1967)). 
 276. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in 
Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (1981); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 38 (1984); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 324-
25 (1962).  
 277. See, e.g., Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. v. Limited, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 246, 
253 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948); 
Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 532 F.2d 674 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
429 U.S. 940 (1976). 
 278. Andrew I. Gavil, After Daubert: Discerning the Increasingly fine Line Between 
the Admissibility and Sufficiency of Expert Testimony in Antitrust Litigation, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 663 (1997). 
 279. On the use of expert testimony in antitrust litigation, see generally id. 
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market conditions to the detriment of consumers often involves a vast 
theoretical and empirical undertaking, if it can be accomplished at all. 
“Identifying market power in the markets encountered in litigation is 
often difficult, and quantifying market power with anything approaching 
precision is frequently impossible.”280 
Aside from practical concerns, the conceptual difficulties 
associated with proof of market power in litigation are truly legion. 
First, the various definitions of the term “market power” can present 
problems because there is no single definition that courts employ. 
“Market power” and “monopoly power” are often conflated in the case 
law. The Supreme Court has defined monopoly power as “the power to 
control prices or exclude competition.”281 Controlling prices and 
excluding competition are two different things, and especially the latter 
has received little attention in the case law and it is unclear if the 
concept applies in a Section 1 case. 
One variant of the definition based on the power to control prices 
was offered by leading antitrust law and economics scholars Landes and 
Posner in their influential 1981 article, “Market Power in Antitrust 
Cases.”282 Landes and Posner defined market power as a firm’s power to 
raise and maintain prices above competitive levels without losing so 
many sales that it must rescind the increase.283 Their definition proved 
influential and has often been used by the courts.284 Nevertheless, that 
definition contains well-recognized holes. A rival that introduces a new 
and better product often may profitably charge prices “above the 
competitive levels” for existing products, but that does not normally 
equate to any sort of market power that antitrust ought to be concerned 
with. For another example, even a perfect cartel (or monopolist) faces 
upper limits on its ability to raise prices – the sky is never the limit. Put 
somewhat differently, a monopolist can appear to face competition from 
products that would not be regarded as substitutes at competitive prices, 
but those products might nevertheless draw consumer substitution 
                                                                                                                 
 280. HOVENKAMP, supra note 124, at 80. 
 281. United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391, 426 n.26 
(1956). 
 282. Landes & Posner, supra note 284, at 939; see also 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 501 (1985). 
 283. Landes & Posner, supra note 284, at 937. 
 284. See, e.g., Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 491 F.3d 380, 388 (8th 
Cir. 2007); R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Cigarettes Cheaper!, 462 F.3d 690, 695 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (citing Landes & Posner, supra note 284). 
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simply because of the monopoly pricing: thus the monopolist appears 
not to be a monopolist precisely because it is one.285 Thus the definition 
yields both false positives, treating a new entrant with an innovative 
product’s price advantage as having its market power, and false 
negatives, such as where a monopolist cannot raise prices simply 
because they are already at the monopolist’s profit-maximizing levels. 
More often, though, the problem with the Landes/Posner definition is a 
more basic practical one: just what is the competitive price for a widget? 
The plaintiff’s case presumes that actual prices have been inflated by 
collusion, but proving the “but for” competitive price that would have 
existed in the absence of collusion is likely to be theoretical and mostly 
conjectural. 
As an alternative to power over price, market share thresholds have 
often been used as a marker for market power, and courts frequently 
treat high market shares as equating to market power.286 However, even 
if there were consensus about what percentage constitutes market power, 
market shares are simply a historic measure of past sales and not 
necessarily accurate in predicting the power of sellers to collude and 
control prices on current or future transactions. Even a 100% market 
share is not decisive: for example, presumably the last umbrella repair 
shop in Waterbury, Connecticut had a 100% market share until it too 
finally went out of business, but it probably had no dangerous power 
over consumers just before it did. Yet courts often rely heavily on 
market shares as determinative of market power,287 and the federal 
agencies’ various articulations of antitrust law also emphasize market 
share calculations as supporting prima facie or preliminary assessments 
of market power, although courts and agencies explicitly also take other 
                                                                                                                 
 285. This is commonly referred to as the “Cellophane Fallacy” based on the 
Supreme Court’s erroneous analysis in United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 351 
U.S. 377 (1956). See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE 128 (1976) (discussing the so-called “cellophane fallacy”); see also 
United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 103-05 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 286. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Tech. Servs., 504 U.S. 451, 470 (1992) 
(“Because market power is often inferred from market share, market definition 
generally determines the result of the case.”); Pitofsky, supra note 279, at1806-13. 
 287. See, e.g, Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 470 (“Because market power is often 
inferred from market share, market definition generally determines the result of the 
case.”); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984) (“Similarly, a 
high market share indicates market power only if the market is properly defined to 
include all reasonable substitutes for the product.”). 
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factors into account.288 Market share as a marker for market power 
sometimes presents no practical problems, but in other cases it does. For 
example, a market during its research and development stage has by 
definition no sales from which to make such a calculation. 
As another alternative, some have advocated that a “definition 
keyed to elasticity of demand is more accurate and comprehensive than 
any alternative.”289 Economic theory indicates that firms in competitive 
markets will price at levels where demand is elastic. Elasticity of 
demand takes into account the willingness of consumers to switch away 
from the seller’s products in response to price increases.290 However, 
even adherents of this approach, as a matter of theory, concede that it is 
often not a practical measure in the context of litigation, which drives 
the matter back to more observable measures that are less theoretically 
sound. Because “direct measurement of elasticity will often not be 
possible, surrogates are used and are important. The most widely used 
surrogate measure of market power is to . . . examine market shares, 
entry barriers and potential competition.”291 Furthermore, to avoid the 
problem of the Cellophane fallacy, cross-elasticities need to be 
measured against a theoretical “competitive market price,” which is a 
speculative matter at best. 
There are also other ways in which market power can be 
established, most notably by direct evidence. 292 The point here is not to 
debate the most practical and theoretically sound definition of market 
power for purposes of Section 1 litigation, but merely to indicate that if 
proof on this issue is required for a particular plaintiff’s case, it is far 
                                                                                                                 
 288. ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS ¶ 3.33 
(F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div. 2000) (“In assessing whether an 
agreement may cause anticompetitive harm, the Agencies typically calculate the market 
shares of the participants and of the collaboration.”); 1992 HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES § 1.4 (F.T.C. & U.S. Dep’t of Justice Antitrust Div.). See Am. Council of 
Certified Podiatric Physicians & Surgeons v. Am. Bd. of Podiatric Surgery, Inc., 185 
F.3d 606, 623 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[M]arket share is only a starting point for determining 
whether monopoly power exists, and the inference of monopoly power does not 
automatically follow from the possession of a commanding market share.”). 
 289. See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 44, at 29. 
 290. See Eastman Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469 (“[T]he extent to which one market 
prevents exploitation of another market depends on the extent to which consumers will 
change their consumption of one product in response to a price change in another, i. e., 
the “cross-elasticity of demand.”) 
 291. See SULLIVAN & GRIMES, supra note 44. 
 292. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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from clear just what the plaintiff is supposed to prove or how he is 
supposed to prove it. In some cases this will not matter, such as where 
the defendants obviously have exerted control over the market through 
collusion. In many other cases it will be decisive and yet elusive. 
It seems a simple enough question: Does a rule of reason plaintiff 
need to prove market power? 100 years of jurisprudence has failed to 
deliver a coherent answer. Although there are arguments for and against 
such a requirement, leaving the matter unsettled undermines antitrust as 
a legal regime by deterring meritorious claims when litigation costs 
cannot be predicted with reasonable certainty and by undermining the 
rule of law.293 
 
The Supreme Court’s most recent statement about the issue was in 
Leegin: 
The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a 
practice restrains trade in violation of § 1. Under this rule, the fact 
finder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether 
a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an 
unreasonable restraint on competition. Appropriate factors to take 
into account include specific information about the relevant business 
and the restraint’s history, nature, and effect. Whether the businesses 
involved have market power is a further, significant consideration 
(emphasis added).294 
Does this mean that a plaintiff in a vertical restraints case is 
required to prove that the defendants had market power, or not? Market 
power is a “significant consideration” among other “factors,” which 
suggests that proof is not required, but may be merely useful. Given the 
cost and complexity of introducing this issue into all vertical restraints 
cases, this is not the clearest or most desirable way to leave the matter. 
In Cal. Dental, the Court’s most expansive recent application of the 
rule of reason, neither the majority nor Justice Breyer’s dissent sheds 
any light on this issue. In his dissent, Justice Breyer analyzed the dental 
association’s ban on price and quality advertising under “a rule of 
reason” and identified as one of the four “classical, subsidiary antitrust 
questions” whether the parties have enough market power to make a 
                                                                                                                 
 293. Additional litigation burdens for cases requiring proof of market power are also 
well-known. Defining product and geographic dimensions of competition is, again, a 
complex theoretical and evidentiary matter on which paid experts will disagree. 
 294. Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885-86 (2007) 
(emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted). 
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difference. However, when he approached that issue, he expressed some 
uncertainty about whether market power is really an element of a rule of 
reason case, instead stating: “I shall assume that the Commission must 
prove one additional circumstance, namely, that the Association’s 
restraints would likely have made a real difference in the 
marketplace.”295 He cites a solitary authority in support of this 
assumption.296 The cited authority hardly supports the notion that proof 
of “market power” is a requisite element of a rule of reason case, but 
instead observes that proof is generally required of the defendants’ 
“significant role” in the market, but also observing that “what 
constitutes sufficient proof for this purpose will vary enormously….”297 
Thus this cite was presumably in support of Justice Breyer’s own doubts 
about whether market power is indeed a requisite element of proof in a 
rule of reason case, and thus the assumption for rhetorical purposes. 
Proceeding from this assumption, Justice Breyer easily found market 
power, citing from the record evidence that the association had a market 
share exceeding 90% in one region, and generally over 75% throughout 
the state of California and that there were high entry barriers.298 
In contrast to Justice Breyer’s dissent, the majority paid almost no 
attention to the issue of market power. The opinion recited the ALJ’s 
determination that market power was not shown attrial but did not need 
to be,299 the Commission’s contrary finding that market power was 
established, a dissenting Commissioner’s finding that market power was 
not shown, and the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that substantial evidence 
supported the Commission’s finding of market power.300 The majority 
opinion made no selection among these diverse views as to whether 
market power had in fact been established by the FTC, or, more 
importantly, whether it needed to be established. 
The very fact of this disagreement among so many justices (the 
Court was split five-to-four on the appropriate mode of antitrust 
analysis) in the Cal. Dental litigation is not surprising when one 
considers that the Supreme Court has never unequivocally established 
                                                                                                                 
 295. Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 782, 788 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 296. Id. (citing AREEDA, supra note 2 ¶ 1503) 
 297. See AREEDA, supra note 2 ¶ 1503. 
 298. Cal. Dental, 526 U.S. at 782. 
 299. Id. at 762. 
 300. In re Cal. Dental Ass’n, 121 F.T.C. 190, 272 (March 25, 1996); Cal. Dental 
Ass’n v. FTC, 128 F.3d 720, 725, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1997); Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 
526 U.S. at 762-63. 
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whether market power is or is not an essential element of a rule of 
reason case. (It is of interest, of course, that so many disagreed not only 
as to whether the issue needed resolution, but also on how it came out.) 
Lower courts and the federal agencies have thus taken disparate 
views. Some courts have seized on market power as a surrogate for 
proof of actual anticompetitive effects, citing language to that effect in 
FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists.301 There, the Supreme Court was 
adjudicating a concerted refusal by dentists to provide certain services, 
which the Court found to be a “naked” restraint but subject to some 
degree of rule of reason analysis in light of the professional context. The 
extent of rule of reason analysis, however, was slight, or as the Court put 
it, “not a matter of any great difficulty.”302 In that particular context, the 
Court stated: 
Since the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market 
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for 
genuine adverse effects on competition, “proof of actual detrimental 
effects, such as a reduction of output,” can obviate the need for an 
inquiry into market power, which is but a “surrogate for detrimental 
effects.”303 
The lower courts are confused by this. Some, but not all, lower 
courts have taken this to mean that in any case in which anticompetitive 
effects must be shown, proof of market power is an alternative method 
of proof, rather than an independently required element of plaintiff’s 
case. For example, in United States v. Brown University,304 the Third 
Circuit took the view that once plaintiff has established anticompetitive 
effects or market power, the burden then shifts to the defendant “to 
show that the challenged conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-
competitive objective.”305 The market power alternative is likely to 
dominate in courts that follow this rule. Courts have recognized that the 
inability to prove actual anticompetitive effects is not uncommon. As 
Professor Areeda observed, “[e]ven an elaborate trial will seldom enable 
the tribunal to reach confident judgments about the past or future. We 
cannot realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently all that bears 
on competitive impact.”306 However, the alternative mode of proof at 
                                                                                                                 
 301. 476 U.S. 447, 460-61 (1986). 
 302. Id. at 459. 
 303. Id. at 460 (citing and quoting AREEDA, supra note 2, ¶ 151). 
 304. 5 F.3d 658 (1993). 
 305. Id. 
 306. AREEDA, supra note 2, ¶ 1500. 
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least allows for the possibility of avoiding the complex theoretical and 
evidentiary issues involved in proof of the contours of relevant markets 
and the defendant’s power. 
The Second Circuit has devised a different approach that defers the 
market power issue until (at least) after the defendants have countered 
plaintiff’s proof of anticompetitive effects with their own evidence of 
procompetitive offsetting benefits.307 At that point: “the plaintiff must 
then show that the same pro-competitive effect could be achieved 
through an alternative means that is less restrictive of competition. 
Typically, the starting point is to define the relevant market . . . and to 
determine whether the defendants possess market power in the relevant 
market.”308 However, even then the Second Circuit acknowledges that 
“the precise role that market power plays in the rule of reason analysis is 
unclear.”309 Indeed, another Second Circuit case endorsed an entirely 
different analysis that puts proof of market power at the very beginning 
of rule of reason proof: 
For the government to prevail in a rule of reason case under Section 
1, the district court concluded, and the parties do not argue 
otherwise, that the following must be shown: As an initial matter, the 
government must demonstrate that the defendant conspirators have 
‘market power’ in a particular market for goods or services. Next, 
the government must demonstrate that within the relevant market, 
the defendants’ actions have had substantial adverse effects on 
competition, such as increases in price, or decreases in output or 
quality. Once that initial burden is met, the burden of production 
shifts to the defendants, who must provide a procompetitive 
justification for the challenged restraint.310 
                                                                                                                 
 307. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin 
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 308. Id. at 1332 (citing Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc., 117 F.3d 50, 56 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). 
 309. Id.; see also Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 
996 F.2d 537, 546 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that “[t]he precise role that market power 
plays in rule of reason analysis of horizontal combinations or conspiracies is a matter of 
some dispute”). 
 310. United States v. Visa USA, Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir. 2003), accord New 
York by Abrams v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 811 F. Supp. 848, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(indicating that the purpose of condemning a restraint is only served where it has the 
potential to bring about adverse market-wide harm to consumers). 
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Thus the Second Circuit, which did not take issue with the trial 
court’s approach in Visa, appears not to have resolved the matter. 
Still other Circuits take additional and diverse approaches. The 
Seventh Circuit has established a rigid “rule that substantial market 
power is a threshold requirement of all rule of reason (as well as some 
per se) cases.”311 The D.C. Circuit also appears to follow this approach. 
In Rothery Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., Judge Bork 
wrote: 
We might well rest, therefore, upon the absence of market power as 
demonstrated both by Atlas’ 6% national market share and by the 
structure of the market. If it is clear that Atlas and its agents by 
eliminating competition among themselves are not attempting to 
restrict industry output, then their agreement must be designed to 
make the conduct of their business more effective. No third 
possibility suggests itself.312 
Judge Bork’s analysis in Rothery Storage has been taken to 
establish a “safe harbor” rule under which a defendant’s conduct will 
under no circumstances be condemned in the absence of proof of market 
power, a position advocated by some commentators.313 
The Seventh Circuit approach finds support from the American Bar 
Association Section of Antitrust law, whose Sample Jury Instructions 
require all plaintiffs to prove the relevant market, and also provide: “In 
determining if the restraint here substantially harmed competition you 
should consider defendant’s market power and how much of the relevant 
market was affected by defendant’s restraint.”314 By requiring the jury to 
find that plaintiff proved a relevant market, and also requiring it to 
consider the defendant’s market power, the Instructions essentially 
                                                                                                                 
 311. Hardy v. City Optical Inc., 39 F.3d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Chi. Prof’l 
Sports Ltd. P’ship v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 673 (7th Cir. 1992); see also Gen. 
Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat’l Truck Leasing Ass’n, 744 F.2d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 1984) 
(plaintiff’s showing of defendants’ market power is a prerequisite to recovery). 
 312. 792 F.2d 210, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987). 
 313. See Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Rule of Reason Analysis of Horizontal 
Agreements: Agreements Designed to Advance Innovation and Commercialize 
Technology, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 579, 606 (1993) (advocating for the “safe harbor” 
approach). 
 314. SAMPLE JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL ANTITRUST CASES A-6 (A.B.A. 1999 
ed.); see also id. at A-7, n.2 (noting that “‘the meaning of market power’ in rule of 
reason cases has not been clearly explained or defined by the Supreme Court”). The 
authors do not, however, question whether proof of market power, on some definition 
or other, is required. 
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import a market power requirement for rule of reason cases. Notably, 
other elements of proof are non-mandatory, such as that the jury “may 
consider defendant’s purpose in imposing the restraint.”315 
The result: Courts and commentators have, after 100 years, failed to 
coalesce around any single view, and some Circuits appear to have 
expressed no view at all.316 
 
3. Theoretical or Actual Effects as a  
Business Justification Defense? 
 
Another missing piece is whether, and at what point, a rule of 
reason analysis turns on actual marketplace effects rather than merely 
plausible or conjectural ones. Proof of actual effects should play a very 
different role than theoretical conjecture about possible or plausible 
ones. Rule of reason analysis proceeds step-wise, and an early step is to 
determine how much analysis is useful. This determination must be 
made on the basis of theory coupled with common sense but without 
much evidence, because the whole point of this inquiry is to determine 
how much evidence the parties will eventually need to bring forward. 
These threshold issues include whether there are plausible 
anticompetitive effects that could flow from the restraint and whether 
there might be offsetting efficiency justifications. 
The ultimate and separate issue under any antitrust review is the 
restraint’s actual net effects – does the restraint actually impair 
competition and harm consumers.317 Actual effects and plausible ones 
ought to be kept separate but they have become muddled in antitrust 
decisions. The theoretically plausible effects arguments ought to be 
front-loaded in the litigation, and merely to serve the court as it 
establishes how much inquiry is required to resolve the case. Proof of 
actual anticompetitive and procompetitive effects should be reserved for 
                                                                                                                 
 315. Id. at A-7. 
 316. Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., 996 F.2d 537, 
546 (2d Cir.1993) (“The proper role of market power in the § 1 rule of reason analysis 
has been characterized differently by the various circuits. Some courts require that a 
plaintiff always show the defendant’s market power in order to state a § 1 claim . . . . 
This court has not made a showing of market power a prerequisite for recovery in all § 
1 cases.”). 
 317. The only exception is that per se rules allow for the possibility that conduct 
without anticompetitive effects will at times be condemned. See FTC v. Superior Court 
Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
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later on because it makes no sense to require that parties to prove the 
ultimate issue in the case merely to determine how much they must 
prove. 
Here, again, Cal. Dental contributes to the confusion by blurring 
the distinction between theoretical effects and actual ones: 
[B]efore a theoretical claim of anticompetitive effects can justify 
shifting to a defendant the burden to show empirical evidence of 
procompetitive effects, as quick-look analysis in effect requires, 
there must be some indication that the court making the decision has 
properly identified the theoretical basis for the anticompetitive 
effects and considered whether the effects actually are 
anticompetitive.(emphasis added) 318 
Whether a case can proceed as a quick-look review ought to be 
decided early on and without requiring empirical evidence from either 
party. It is pointless to put the Court and the parties to the trouble and 
expense of a full-blown rule of reason trial to determine if a quick look 
review would have sufficed. Yet Cal. Dental forces a Section 1 plaintiff 
at the very outset of the case to establish “whether the effects are 
actually anticompetitive” in order to counter purely theoretical economic 
justifications offered by a defendant. A plaintiff’s failure to produce 
such evidence on actual effects renders a quick-look analysis 
inappropriate and relieves the defendant of a “burden to show empirical 
evidence of procompetitive effects.” 
All that the defendant provided in Cal. Dental was purely 
theoretical support for its position that restricting price advertising in 
that particular context might increase, rather than diminish, output. The 
Court explored these speculative justifications in considerable depth 
(and without any apparent skepticism) to conclude that the lower court 
had prematurely shifted the burden to the defendant. Based on academic 
abstract explorations of some unusual demand attributes that might 
pertain in some markets for professional services, the Court held that 
plaintiff had not met its burden to submit the case to a quick look 
evaluation. The result in Cal. Dental was that once the defendant 
submitted a purely theoretical basis to support the case for an in-depth 
rule of reason analysis, the trial court was supposed to have reverted to 
the plaintiff to establish actual anticompetitive effects as an empirical 
matter with more than just a theoretical case; to establish both “the 
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theoretical basis for the anticompetitive effects and . . . whether the 
effects actually are anticompetitive.”319 
This moves plaintiff’s proof of actual anticompetitive effects to the 
fore, placing that burden on the plaintiff before the trial court has even 
established the level of rule of reason review for the case. Because the 
FTC had not produced evidence to establish actual anticompetitive 
effects in the market for dental services, the decision does not indicate 
what would happen if it had done so, but presumably defendant would 
then be required to rebut with offsetting procompetitive actual effects. 
All of this was supposed to have taken place in the context of a 
determination of what sort of antitrust review should have been 
required. 
As thus structured in Cal. Dental, to determine whether a quick 
look is “meet for the case,” plaintiff presents a theory of competitive 
harm, defendant may counter with a theory of competitive justification 
or offsetting efficiencies, and then plaintiff must proceed with an 
evidentiary presentation to establish actual anticompetitive effects, 
possibly followed by defendants’ factual rebuttal. The parties are thus 
drawn into a potentially full-blown rule of reason case that is triggered 
by a purely theoretical, abstract and conjectural defense. 
The effectiveness of this strategy for the dental association, in the 
context of an agreement among competitors with market power not to 
advertise prices, indicates just how likely the invited strategy will be to 
succeed in the run of antitrust cases. 
 
III. THE FTC’S ATTEMPT AT REFORM –  
THE “INHERENTLY SUSPECT” FRAMEWORK 
 
The FTC has devised a model for the rule of reason that begins by 
categorizing the challenged restraint, and then proceeds according to a 
decision tree based upon that categorization. The analysis derives from 
cases dating as far back as 1988,320 and finds its first full exposition in 
PolyGram Holdings.321 
Under PolyGram Holdings, the first step in the analysis involves 
the determination of whether the alleged restraint is one that is 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Id. 
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 321. See 416 F.3d 29 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
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“inherently suspect.”322 This determination is focused on proof of the 
agreement itself rather than its effects, which are presumed based upon 
the nature of the restraint. A restraint is categorized as inherently suspect 
if, “based upon economic learning and the experience of the market, it is 
obvious that a restraint of trade likely impairs competition.”323 Unlike 
per se offenses, inherently suspect conduct is subject to a rebuttable 
presumption of illegality. Thus, the categories of conduct that may be 
deemed to be inherently suspect are not limited to the narrow categories 
of price fixing, market allocations and group boycotts. However, courts 
that have followed the FTC’s framework have described the classes of 
“inherently suspect” conduct as bearing a “close family resemblance” to 
per se offenses. Thus, the particular conduct that has fallen under this 
approach has included an agreement between joint venturers not to price 
compete on related products outside the joint venture for a period 
leading up to the venture’s own product launch;324 coordination of 
bidding to payment plans by independent physicians;325 and a multiple 
listing service rule restricting the listing of limited-service options and 
excluding discount listings from default search results.326 
If the restraint is so characterized, the next step requires the 
defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality by establishing a 
plausible and legally permissible justification. This requires proof that 
either the context of the particular market in question deflects the 
presumption that would normally apply, or that there are offsetting 
competitive benefits flowing from the restraint. If defendants offer such 
a rebuttal, the court (or FTC) can either reject it on its face if the tribunal 
“can confidently conclude, without adducing evidence, that the restraint 
very likely harmed consumers.”327 Alternatively, the plaintiff can 
provide the tribunal with sufficient evidence to show that 
anticompetitive effects are in fact likely. Finally, the defendants can 
produce evidence that consumers are not harmed at all or that the 
restraint’s net effects are competitively virtuous.328 
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What is useful in the FTC’s “inherently suspect” mode of analysis 
is that for certain rule of reason cases it provides an avenue to resolve 
claims without resort to litigation over market effects, which is often 
speculative, indeed generally inherently so. The proof of marketplace 
impact is tested with so-called “but-for” analysis, which requires the 
fact-finder to weigh the prognostications of competing hired experts 
about the world as it would have been absent the alleged restraint. This 
aspect of antitrust litigation is high-cost, low-return. Where a claim falls 
short of suitable application of a per se rule, the “inherently suspect” 
model allows the court to weigh the defendants’ proffered justifications 
against the inherent anticompetitive effects.329 
This benefit follows from the return by the FTC to a categorical 
approach to at least the most inherently suspect sorts of restraints. Rather 
than leaving these restraints to the literal terms of Cal. Dental, the 
“inherently suspect” model starts by characterizing the restraint and then 
applying its rebuttable presumption. Under Cal. Dental’s directive, 
every restraint is entitled to its own mode of analysis crafted as “meet 
for the case.” The “inherently suspect” analysis establishes a generalized 
mode of analysis for cases falling within the category. This approach is 
unlikely to condemn desirable marketplace conduct because it is limited 
to conduct that is closely related to per se offenses. It is also of value in 
streamlining litigation and lending a measure of predictability to the 
law. 
There are frailties, however, with the FTC’s “inherently suspect” 
framework. First, it is limited to restraints that are so obviously 
offensive as to be arguably per se violations. The agreement in 
PolyGram not to discount or advertise competing products that were not 
part of the joint venture was the sort of joint venture spillover collusion 
that the D.C. Circuit observed “looks suspiciously like a naked price 
fixing agreement between competitors.”330 The agreement in Realcomp 
II had no apparent purpose other than to impair innovative competition 
from discount providers of real estate brokerage services. One element 
of the FTC’s case, for example, was that the Realcomp members’ rule 
imposed a “minimum service requirement” which directly eliminated 
competition along an important dimension of consumer choice with the 
obvious potential for forcing more services on them at higher cost 
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(which was not surprisingly found to have been the intent).331 Thus, 
“inherently suspect” as a category has in its quite limited experience 
applied a truncated analysis only to conduct that might plausibly be 
condemned without any analysis at all. 
Another frailty is that the “inherently suspect” framework has 
failed to gel into an unambiguous mode of analysis. This is partly 
because the framework has only been applied in a small number of 
recent cases. However, those applications have generated considerable 
confusion. Realcomp II in particular undermines the potential value of 
the model because the opinion of the Commission in that case purported 
to apply “inherently suspect” framework but at the same time engaged 
in elaborate fact-finding on the very complex issues that the model 
purports to avoid: market power and actual anticompetitive effects. For 
no apparent reason, the FTC’s opinion lays out and then applies three 
different modes of analysis, including “inherently suspect,” actual 
anticompetitive effects and market power analysis, and then proceeds to 
apply all three. 
Here, for completeness, we address all three of these modes of 
analysis. Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, although it is 
convenient to treat each of these modes of analysis separately, the 
Court’s decisions, particularly California Dental, also make clear 
that all of these forms of analysis are simply different means to 
pursue the same ‘essential inquiry. . . - whether or not the challenged 
restraint enhances competition.’332 
There is not much value in a truncated mode of analysis if its 
application invites excursions into the same difficult areas as a full-
blown analysis. Realcomp II can be seen as a highly defensive 
application of the “inherently suspect” framework, or even a retreat 
from it. If the whole point of truncated analysis is to avoid the costly, 
time-consuming and potentially confusing excursions into complex 
issues, it makes little sense to indulge in those very excursions in a case 
that calls for truncated analysis. The FTC’s opinion undermines the 
value of truncated categorical analysis in the interest of “completeness,” 
when completeness is the very thing that truncated analysis seeks to 
avoid. If completeness were always a virtue, then categorical framework 
to permit truncated analysis would necessarily always be a vice. 
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The FTC’s truncated analysis for restraints that are categorized as 
“inherently suspect” could be harnessed to alleviate some of the 
confusion left in the wake of Cal. Dental by returning to a categorical 
framework that Cal. Dental essentially dismissed. However, it is a 
nascent framework with little decisional law development, and it has 
been obscured by the FTC’s defensive application of the doctrine. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 
There are three steps that the Supreme Court (or Congress) could 
take to alleviate the problems that have been identified with the rule of 
reason. First, Board of Trade should be abandoned. Its articulation of the 
rule of reason standard is too open-ended to guide courts through the 
maze of issues it includes as relevant to antitrust conspiracy analysis. 
Second, Cal. Dental should also be overruled as setting an unworkable 
standard, indeed as having abandoned standards altogether. Finally, the 
Court should return Section 1 to categorical analysis. If the categories of 
“per se,” “truncated or quick look,” and “full-blown” are deemed too 
likely to generate false outcomes, then the solution is not necessarily to 
abandon all hope of predictability and transparency in antitrust law. 
Instead, the courts should begin the task of generating categories that 
work. 
A. ABANDONING BOARD OF TRADE 
There is a commanding scholarly consensus that the oft-repeated 
rule of reason standard enunciated in Board of Trade has done more 
harm than good. It ought to be jettisoned. Board of Trade’s most famous 
and enduring statement of the rule of reason is fairly regarded by careful 
students of antitrust law as “among the most damaging language in the 
history of Sherman Act jurisprudence.” A first important step that the 
Supreme Court could take to eliminate some of the problems with rule 
of reason antitrust litigation would be to overrule that case, and in 
particular to repudiate its language. 
There is no particular reason why the articulation of the rule of 
reason in this one case should be left in place. The Court has not 
hesitated to repudiate what it comes to regard as ill-advised articulations 
of legal standards, however well-worn they may be. In Bell Atlantic 
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Corp. v. Twombly,333 the Court repudiated the time-honored language 
that had summarized the notice pleading standard from Conley v. 
Gibson.334 The language from the Conley decision that drew the 
Twombly court’s particular consternation was its most frequently quoted 
standard for evaluating a complaint under Rule 8: 
In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, 
the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure 
to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can 
prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him 
to relief.335 
That “no set of facts” language had been relied in the vast majority 
of published rulings on motions to dismiss federal complaints.336 The 
Court in Twombly not only adjusted the standards for notice pleading, 
but explicitly denounced and “interred” its language: “Conley’s ‘no set 
of facts’ language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away 
long enough . . . .”337 
Any legal standard should at a minimum be articulated with 
sufficient clarity to guide the conduct of those who are subject to its 
requirements. Board of Trade does no such thing. It instead invites 
judicial inquiry into a nearly limitless array of obscure factors, it offers 
no prescription for how any of those ought to be weighed, and it has 
failed after more than ninety years to yield consistent answers to some 
of the most basic questions presented in Section 1 litigation, and it has 
no discernible scholarly support. To the contrary, the Court has ignored 
a steady drumbeat of criticism of this precedent.338 It has been 
“questioned and criticized” long enough. 
B. OVERRULING CAL. DENTAL 
If scholars agree that Board of Trade’s articulation of the rule of 
reason is confusing, there ought to be at least an equal consensus that 
Cal. Dental only made matters worse. It too should be discarded insofar 
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as it lays out an ill-conceived burden shifting process, and also as to the 
empty standard it prescribes for determining how much of an inquiry is 
appropriate in antitrust cases under Section 1. Flexibility in antitrust 
analysis has its value, but that value is not limitless and nor should the 
flexibility of substantive standards be limitless. An “enquiry meet for the 
case” goes too far in the direction of devoiding the rule of reason of any 
standard whatsoever. Along with “no set of facts” and the liturgy from 
Board of Trade, “an enquiry meet for the case” should be interred. 
Predictability and transparency are particularly desirable qualities 
for antitrust conspiracy law. Most business collaboration is more 
nuanced than the sort of criminal price fixing and market allocation that 
draws unequivocal antitrust condemnation. This vast region of economic 
cooperation is of enormous importance to global economic well-being, 
and includes conduct ranging from standard setting (without which the 
modern technology economy could not exist) to more old-fashioned 
product distribution arrangements. The failure of antitrust law to provide 
reasonably clear guidance in this region of activity cannot help but 
impose pointless costs. Business managers planning their company’s 
affairs can only respond to undecipherable antitrust rules in one of two 
ways: either by resolving doubt in favor of their proposed conduct, or 
alternatively resolving doubts against the considered course of action. 
Optimists will tend to impair competition by violating the standards that 
ought to be in place; pessimists will tend to compete too cautiously (and 
thus contributing to the “false positive” problem that seems to have 
animated much of the judicial drift toward blunting antitrust rules). 
Courts are equally confounded, as the above discussion explores. It 
ought to be regarded as unacceptable that the rule of reason after 100 
years has failed even to resolve such basic matters as whether market 
power is a requisite element of proof and how a court should decide 
whether a full-blown analysis is even required. 
As Professor Stucke has argued, the rule of reason does not even 
comply with rule of law standards and Cal. Dental actually aggravated 
matters.339 As Stucke points out, the rule of reason undermines the rule 
of law in the context of antitrust by providing market participants with 
inadequate advance assurance about how the power of government will 
be exerted upon them. 340 Cal. Dental moves the rule of reason further 
from rule of law norms by obscuring until after the fact the legal 
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standard that will apply to conduct. Conduct that might be found to be 
permissible under one level of review can easily be condemned under a 
more stringent one, as the tortured path of the litigation in Cal. Dental 
itself makes clear. An “enquiry meet for the case” amounts to ex post 
facto regulation because what is “meet” is indeterminate until the 
conduct has already been engaged in; until it gets evaluated by a 
tribunal. Thus the substantive standard of review announced in Cal. 
Dental ought to be repudiated. 
The procedural structuring of civil antitrust litigation should also 
achieve predictability, administrability and fairness in the resolution of 
cases. Cal. Dental achieves none of these ends. It’s shifting of an 
unspecified evidentiary burden to the plaintiff in response to defendants’ 
purely theoretical articulation of a plausible and conjectural justification 
makes no sense as part of a litigation process for determining what the 
evidentiary burdens of the parties should be. For one thing, it is far too 
easy for defendants to articulate some sort of efficiency justification that 
might have had something to do with their collusive conduct. The 
litigation process becomes unjustifiably skewed if the plaintiff must bear 
the burden of adducing evidence sufficient to show “actual 
anticompetitive effects” – possibly before pre-trial discovery has even 
proceeded.341 
Cal. Dental and the Court’s recent aversion to “false positives” 
have made perfection the enemy of the good. Recall Areeda’s 
admonition that “[e]ven an elaborate trial will seldom enable the tribunal 
to reach confident judgments about the past or future We cannot 
realistically hope to know and to weigh confidently all that bears on 
competitive impact.”342 Moreover, from the court’s perspective, the 
whole point of limiting rule of reason evidence is to advance the 
efficient use of judicial resources. That is not the result of Cal. Dental’s 
process. Thus from a procedural vantage point, as well as the substantive 
one, this decision causes mischief and should be overruled. 
C. RESTRUCTURING THE RULE OF REASON 
The rule of reason should be reinvigorated in the interest of both 
predictability and the underlying social value of antitrust enforcement. 
The ultimate substantive law standards of conduct are not in doubt: 
Section 1 prohibits private non-immune conduct that restrains 
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competition more than it promotes it. This substantive standard should 
equate to, or at least conform quite closely to, the results of litigation 
under the rule of reason. That is, conduct that, on balance, promotes 
competition should be adjudicated as lawful, and conduct that, on 
balance, harms competition should be adjudicated as unlawful. That the 
current rule of reason is widely regarded as “euphemism for non-
liability”343 indicates just how poorly the rule performs in promoting the 
value of antitrust. At a time that has witnessed an historic explosion of 
global adoption of antitrust as a legal paradigm, the United States has 
managed to undermine its own framework by eroding any content that 
the rule of reason ever had, while subjecting nearly all concerted activity 
to this unguided evaluation. That a reasoned argument has been made 
that the rule of reason does not even live up to the modest demands of 
the rule of law indicates just how little predictability the rule of reason 
provides. 
There needs to be a simplified, consistent and predictable 
substantive legal framework for Section 1 that is capable of sorting good 
or neutral conduct from bad in an administrable manner. The demise of 
categorical analysis under Section 1 has made this impossible. It thus 
stands to reason that categorical analysis needs to be restored. It is no 
answer to say that the “rigid” categories of yesterday yielded false 
positives. Not only is there no empirical evidence to support that 
contention, but every rule of law is capable of some mischief – which is 
not to say laws should be abandoned. 
Instead of abandoning categorical analysis in the interest of 
perfection, the categories should be developed along more refined lines. 
As a starting point, there ought at least to be four identifiable categories 
of antitrust review under Section 1: 
 
The Per Se Illegal Category (Irrebuttably Presumed 
Anticompetitive). The per se category includes naked horizontal 
restraints on price, output, innovation and market access. 
a. These require no inquiry into market context or effects, and 
are irrebuttably presumed to be illegal. 
b. Defendants should be able to challenge the characterization 
of their conduct as falling into one of these per se forbidden 
categories in an orderly, predictable fashion. For example, 
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the wisdom of the BMI decision344 could be accommodated 
by allowing defendants to articulate (as was done in that 
case) how the restraint benefits consumers in a way that 
cannot be achieved via other less restrictive alternatives. 
Sufficient proof on this point should divert the case to the 
“inherently suspect” category below. 
The Inherently Suspect Category (Rebuttable Presumption of 
Illegality). Inherently suspect horizontal restraints include conduct 
similar to per se offenses in joint venture, league sports, and 
professional contexts. 
a. This category should follow the framework set out in 
PolyGram345 without the unnecessary and duplicative resort 
to more complex modes of analysis applied in Realcomp II. 
346 These restraints are rebuttably presumed to be 
anticompetitive, subject to defendants’ proffering sufficient, 
non-pretextual justifications to show net procompetitive 
effects. 
b. Market definition, market power and anticompetitive 
effects are irrelevant to this mode of analysis. 
Presumptively Lawful Category (Rebuttable Presumption of 
Legality). In the modern economic context, it is likely that most 
interaction among rivals does not adversely affect the marketplace, and 
much collaboration is essential for competition to exist. Standard setting 
(including safety, interoperability and other standards established with 
horizontal collaboration), patent licensing, collaborative research and 
development are just a few examples. 
a. Conduct falling into this category should be presumed 
lawful, and the burden should thus shift to the plaintiff to 
establish that the agreement is anticompetitive. 
b. Courts should clarify that proof of anticompetitive effects 
can be established alternatively by proof of market power 
(and thus relevant market definition) or direct proof so that 
not all cases will be weighed down with the complexities of 
cross-elasticity analysis implicit in market power evidence. 
Per Se Lawful Category. Commentators have toyed with the idea that 
courts should develop a category for conduct that is irrebuttably 
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presumed to be lawful, although the argument has been limited to 
vertical restraints.347 
 
It is of course true that categorizing conduct as, say, “a horizontal 
output restraint in a professional context,” may in some cases lead to 
condemnation of conduct that in a perfect world might be tolerated. It 
bears consideration, though, whether the Republic could not have 
endured the absence of the California Dental Association’s rule against 
across-the-board discounts. Categorically speaking, the Association’s 
rule should not have admitted a nearly full-blown rule of reason 
excursion into the speculative and highly unlikely possibility that dental 
patients actually consume more services as a consequence of the 
restraint alleged in that case. Instead, it should have been characterized 
as a preliminary matter for what it was: a price restraint in a market for 
professional services. The defendants should then have borne the burden 
of establishing that which Justice Souter conjured up in his opinion, 
although one has reason to doubt that the Association would then have 
prevailed. 
1. A Partial Response to Lemley and Leslie 
Lemley and Leslie have argued that categories are ill-suited to 
antitrust analysis and should be largely abandoned altogether; that 
“enthusiasm for taxonomy has run amok in antitrust law, with 
pernicious consequences.”348 Aside from a very small category of per se 
offenses, they argue that categorical analysis has infected antitrust law 
with a strong tendency toward error. The central concern behind their 
argument is consistent with the thrust here, which is that antitrust law 
has become intolerably muddled. Yet they come to a seemingly opposite 
conclusion and advocate jettisoning categories from the rule of reason. 
Their argument starts from the questionable premise that categories 
continue to dominate in antitrust notwithstanding Cal. Dental;349 and 
they then argue that categorical analysis in antitrust has become so 
incoherent that it should be even more thoroughly abandoned. In 
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particular, the dividing line between “quick look’ and “full blown” rule 
of reason analysis is in their view untenable: 
The evolution of quick look analysis has made matters worse, as 
confusion over whether a challenged restraint falls within the “quick 
look” or requires “full-blown rule of reason analysis” introduces 
significant uncertainty into antitrust litigation.350 
Furthermore, they argue, categorical analysis is subject to 
manipulation by plaintiffs, who try to force conduct into a forbidden 
category; and (relatedly) categorical analysis also produces false 
positives, or condemnation of benign conduct. At the heart, their 
objection to resort to categories in antitrust analysis is that it may lead to 
error, through manipulation or otherwise. “When courts focus on 
categorization instead of competitive effects, it increases the probability 
of mistakes.”351 
Lemley and Leslie then argue that antitrust law should operate 
much like tort negligence law, relying on broad standards rather than 
categories. The standard that they argue should apply is whether 
competition is harmed by the alleged conduct. They would therefore 
place substantial or even decisive weight on the court’s determination of 
market power, on the ground that an absence of market power signals an 
inability for the defendant or defendannts to adversely affect 
competition or consumers. Their conclusion that antitrust law is now 
muddled is consistent with the argument here, but their solution seems 
flawed. 
First, it is doubtful whether Lemley and Leslie are correct in 
asserting that categorical antitrust analysis within the rule of reason 
survived Cal Dental, which (as they acknowledge) explicitly moved in 
another direction: “The truth is that our categories of analysis of 
anticompetitive effect are less fixed than terms like ‘per se,’ ‘quick 
look,’ and ‘rule of reason’ tend to make them appear.” Most observers 
agree that the Court dismantled the boundaries between categories of 
conduct in favor of a continuum; that “quick look” and “full blown” are 
merely part of a continuum between per se illegality at one end and 
efficient or competitively neutral conduct at the other. Indeed, Lemley 
and Leslie are virtually alone in attacking Cal Dental as having 
maintained categories of analysis. Prof. Hovenkamp, for example, 
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concludes that “[i]n its California Dental Association . . . decision the 
Supreme Court observed that there is no bright line between per se and 
rule of reason analysis, but rather a continuum.”352 The lower courts 
have also understood the Supreme Court to have shifted rule of reason 
analysis to a continuum. In PolyGram, for example, the Court explained 
that the categories of analysis courts refer to as “per se,” “quick look” 
and “rule of reason” do not represent discrete categories of analysis, but 
rather define a continuum: 
It would be somewhat misleading, however, to say the “quick look” 
is just a new category of analysis intermediate in complexity 
between “per se” condemnation and full-blown “rule of reason” 
treatment, for that would suggest the Court has moved from a 
dichotomy to a trichotomy, when in fact it has backed away from 
any reliance upon fixed categories and toward a continuum.353 
More importantly, even if they read Cal. Dental correctly, Lemley 
and Leslie seem to understate the problems of moving antitrust to a 
broad standards approach like negligence law. Virtually every problem 
they identify as stemming from the application of categories in antitrust 
law becomes aggravated by shifting to a standards approach. Their core 
concern that antitrust categorical analysis is prone to uncertainty and 
shifting standards seems odd to address by replacing categories of 
review with none. Yet the more obscure antitrust law becomes, the more 
(not less) likely that courts will misapply the law. A review that is “meet 
for the case” provides no basis for businesses to conform their conduct 
to the law’s requirements, or for judges and juries to render consistent 
and predictable adjudications. 
The authors’ reliance on tort law as a model for antitrust also seems 
misplaced. Negligence law, unlike antitrust law, is state common law, 
with standards that are responsive to local community norms of 
behavior. In a negligence trial, jurors selected from a pool of local 
residents are asked to judge a defendant’s conduct using the “reasonable 
person” standard as their guide. Lemley and Leslie argue that this 
                                                                                                                 
 352. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 116 (2005). 
 353. Polygram Holding, Inc. v. FTC, 416 F.3d 29, 35 (D.C. Cir. 2005); see also 
Cont’l Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 499, 509 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating 
that rule of reason and per se modes of analysis are “best viewed as a continuum, on 
which the ‘amount and range of information needed’ to evaluate a restraint varies 
depending on how ‘highly suspicious’ and how ‘unique’ the restraint is.”). 
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“reasonableness” standard can also work in antitrust cases. But 
negligence law is to some unavoidable and desirable extent local and 
responsive to current customs.354 If a lot of people locally engage in 
conduct of a certain sort, such as shooting guns to celebrate New Year’s 
Eve, a local jury is unlikely to find that conduct unreasonable. Similarly, 
as people become accustomed to talking on telephones while walking 
down the street, such customs which at one time would have been 
thought bizarre become normal and acceptable. Tort law adopts both to 
these local standards and to evolving norms more generally. Antitrust 
standards are supposed to work differently. Customs, particularly local 
ones, are not supposed to set antitrust standards. Even if (as was at one 
time the case) many producers of hardwood flooring operated in cartels 
with rivals, that would not redeem the conduct or have any admissible 
impact on the antitrust evaluation of the conduct. “Reasonableness” in 
antitrust law sets neither localized standards nor ones that bend to 
popular behaviors. There is no valid reason to submit the national 
economy to such a mosaic of differing and changing value schemes that 
may be found in different regions or depending on current business 
practices. Instead, antitrust sets standards according to the objective 
economic consequences of conduct. 
Finally, their reliance on a market power screen to prevent error 
ignores the great problems associated with proof of market power in 
antitrust cases. Their legitimate concerns about error in antitrust 
adjudication are poorly addressed by relying on juries or even lay judges 
to define relevant markets accurately enough. Furthermore, proof of 
market power more than any other single issue raises the cost of 
litigation. So while in an ideal sense it would be preferable to screen out 
cases where defendants lack the ability to do any harm, the practical 
ability of courts to do that is limited, reaching questionable results at 
enormous cost. 
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CONCLUSION 
Outside the per se/rule of reason dichotomy, antitrust law should 
develop categories of analysis that are more, rather than less, definite. 
The rule of reason has never done this, and, as it is currently understood, 
is at a historic nadir. The soft dichotomy that once existed between “full 
blown” and “quick look” rule of reason analysis was never enough. 
However, instead of abandoning the cause of clarification, courts should 
embark on a process of refining categories of analysis based on 
presumptions and shifting burdens of proof. 
The rule of reason never worked well and has been subject to 
nearly uniform criticism by scholarly observers. Its expanded role via 
reversals of per se rules, coupled with the abandonment of categorical 
analysis heralded by Cal. Dental, have only made matters worse. The 
courts should adopt a scheme of presumptions, such as the one outlined 
here, to bring some degree of order to antitrust litigation and analysis. 
Categories of conduct should evolve to fall under a particular 
presumption, thus treated as “presumptively lawful,” “presumptively 
unlawful,” etc. By shifting the burden of proof to the party resisting a 
presumption and allowing them to overcome it, the likelihood of error is 
reduced. Over time, conduct types would emerge as falling within these 
categories, which could simplify antitrust analysis for purposes of both 
litigation and business planning. 
 
